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ABSTRACT 
 
The central objective of this study is to examine the policy, legal, and 
constitutional implications resulting from the Chaoulli v. Quebec (2005 1 S.C.R. 791) 
both for the rights of Canadians within the scope of the publicly funded healthcare 
system and the configuration of that system.  In examining the policy implications the 
thesis focuses on Quebec’s Bill 33, Ralph Klein’s “Third Way” proposal, and the 
development of national wait time benchmarks.  In examining the legal implications the 
thesis focuses on the so-called ‘copy-cat cases’ triggered by the Chaoulli case, namely 
Flora v. Ontario, Murray v. Alberta, and McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario.  In examining 
the constitutional implications of Chaoulli the thesis focuses on the expansion of the 
interpretation of Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the elevation of 
timely access to healthcare to a Charter right.   
The study concludes with some observations regarding how Canada’s publicly 
funded healthcare system could evolve in the future and the role of the courts in the 
evolution of the system.  It provides a warning that if appropriate and timely action is 
not taken by federal and provincial officials to minimize wait times in the publicly funded 
healthcare system, the implications of Chaoulli will continue to expand through future 
litigation and judicial decisions. One of the potential outcomes of such litigation and 
decisions is development of a two-tier or multi-tier healthcare system in Canada. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Background: Chaoulli v. Quebec 
 
Many Canadians consider Canada’s universal public healthcare system to be a 
defining attribute of our national identity.  D. Martin Low, Q.C., Lydia Wakulowsky, and 
Geoff Moysa note that since the 1960s Canada has worn its “uniquely world-class” 
universal medicare system proudly on its sleeve.1  Lloyd Axworthy and Jerry Spiegel 
(2002) agree that from the beginning Canadians have been devoted to health care equity, 
viewing universal access to care as a fundamental human right.2  
Despite a number of problems with Canada’s public health system, including long 
wait times in emergency rooms, a lack of specialists, inadequate diagnostic equipment, 
and disparities between provinces, Canadians still show an overwhelming amount of 
support for public healthcare.3 In 2000, Statistics Canada found that 84.4% of Canadians 
rated the quality of overall health services in Canada as being either excellent or very 
good.4   
However, some Canadians have never been comfortable with Canada’s universal 
healthcare system and would prefer a two-tier or private healthcare system.  They argue 
                                                
1 Martin Low, Q.C. et al.,  “Failing on the Fundamentals: The Chaoulli Decision,” Law and Governance 
(14 June 2005), accessed online at http://www.longwoods.com/product.php?productid=17188&page=7 
(Retrieved 12 December 2007). 
2 Lloyd Axworthy and Jerry Spiegel, “Retaining Canada's health care system as a global public good,” The 
Canadian Medical Association Journal (CMAJ) (20 August 2002), accessed online at 
http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/167/4/365#R2-22 (Retrieved 12 December 2007). 
3 Wendy Tso, “The Debate over Canada's Healthcare System,” The Centre for Constitutional Studies: 
University of Alberta (2007), accessed online at http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ccs/Current-
Constitutional-Issues/The-Debate-over-Canadas-Healthcare-System.php (Retrieved 22 December 2007). 
4 Canada, Government of Canada, Department of Health, “Healthy Canadians: A Federal Report on 
Comparable Health Indicators 2002,” (31 March 2006), accessed online at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-
sss/pubs/system-regime/2002-fed-comp-indicat/2002-health-sante7_e.html (Retrieved 12 December 2007). 
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that public health care acts an impediment to ensuring that Canadians receive timely 
access to the kind of medical services they deserve, and believe that a private system 
running alongside the current public system would provide more treatment options and 
more efficient cost effective services through competition.5  As a result, a profit vs. not-
for-profit healthcare debate has been in existence since the beginning of medicare.6  
The Canadian Independent Medical Clinics Association (CIMCA) notes that 
support for private healthcare initiatives has picked up steam in the past decade.7  Dr. 
Brian Day, President of the Canadian Medical Association (CMA), indicates that one 
reason for increased support has been increasingly long wait lists in the public system.  In 
2006 Day told the CIMCA that there are nearly a million people on waiting lists who are 
frustrated with the public system and tired of putting their lives on hold.8  Similarly, the 
Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) found that 32% of Canadians were 
unsatisfied with wait times in 2002-03. 9  
Consequently, wait times began to become the focus of intense media coverage 
and public debate as they steadily increased following the large budget deficits and cuts 
to transfer payments in the 1990’s.10 Lawrie McFarlane, Deputy Minister of Health for 
British Columbia (2005), indicates that most of the concern was on elective surgery and, 
                                                
5 CBC News, “Public vs. private health care,” CBC In Depth: Healthcare (1 December 2006), accessed 
online at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/healthcare/public_vs_private.html (Retrieved 11 December 
2007). 
6 Roy Romanow, “Now’s the Time to Stand up for Medicare,” The Globe and Mail (10 June 2005), 
accessed online at http://www.longwoods.com/product.php?productid=17187 (Retrieved 12 December 
2007). 
7 John G. Smith, “A Snapshot of Private Healthcare in Canada.” The Canadian Independent Medical 
Association (CIMCA) (2006), accessed online at http://www.cimca.ca/newsletter/issue02_04.html 
(Retrieved 12 December 2007). 
8 Ibid. 
9 The Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI), “Waiting for Health Care in Canada: What We 
Know and What We Don’t Know,” Ottawa (2006), vii. 
10 CBC News, “Introduction,” CBC In Depth: Healthcare (22 August 2006), accessed online at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news /background/healthcare/ (Retrieved 18 December 2007). 
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more specifically, orthopedic surgery.  He noted that between 1995 and 2000 gynecologic 
procedures increased by 4%, urological surgery rose 7.7%, and neurosurgery rose 8%.  
Much more dramatically, hip replacement surgery rose by 42%, cataract by 66%, and 
knee replacement surgery by 92%. As a result of an unprecedented surge in procedure 
volumes, wait times increased correspondingly (See Appendix A for data on wait 
times).11   
Longer wait times produced an abundance of negative media attention.  John G. 
Smith notes that almost every day there were examples of poor public service in the 
press, influencing public opinion.  An evolving perception of the public healthcare 
system changed how many patients felt about universal healthcare.  Smith found that 
many patients began to feel they were not receiving what they needed or expected from 
the public system.12  It was out of this feeling of discontent that Chaoulli v. Quebec 
(Attorney General) emerged.  One man felt that he waited longer than appropriate for a 
required orthopedic surgery, and argued that he should have access to a separate, private 
system.  That man was George Zeliotis, and this thesis will discuss how his case changed 
the face of Canadian Medicare forever. 
In 1996, George Zeliotis, a 73-year-old businessman from Quebec, required hip 
replacement surgery and was placed on a waiting list in Montreal for approximately one 
year.  While on the waiting list, Zeliotis claimed to be in constant pain and discomfort 
and wanted to pay for his surgery through a private health care facility.  He also wanted 
to purchase private health insurance in the event that he should have any future health 
                                                
11 Lawrie McFarlane, “Supreme Court slaps for-sale sign on medicare,” The Canadian Medical Association 
Journal (2 August 2005), 173, accessed online at http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/173/3/269 (Retrieved 
13 December 2007). 
12 Smith, “A Snapshot of Private Healthcare in Canada.” 
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problems.13  However, Quebec law prohibited Zeliotis from using private insurance to 
pay for “medically necessary” services.  His only options were to wait for the surgery in 
pain or pay for the surgery out of his own pocket.14 
Dr. Jacques Chaoulli, a controversial physician who provided medical services to 
patients at their homes and had attempted to establish a private and autonomous hospital 
of his own, heard about Mr. Zeliotis’s pain and frustration and contacted him.15   
Together, Dr. Chaoulli and Mr. Zeliotis challenged Quebec legislation that prohibited the 
purchase of private health insurance.   
They took their case to the Quebec Superior Court in 1997, challenging section 11 
of the Hospital Insurance Act (HOIA) and section 15 of the Health Insurance Act (HEIA) 
on the grounds that prohibitions against the right to purchase private health insurance 
violated Mr. Zeliotis’s freedoms under section 1 of the Quebec Charter and sections 7 
and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter (to view theses specific statutes see Appendix B).16  
D. Martin Low, Q.C., a constitutional legal expert, summed up the crux of their argument 
thus—that forcing patients to wait extensive periods of time without recourse violates 
their rights to life and personal security.  He isolated the vital question posed to the courts 
as “whether the prohibition is justified by the need to preserve the integrity of the public 
health system.”17 
In February 2000, Justice Ginette Piche of the Quebec Superior Court rejected the 
claims made by Chaoulli and Zeliotis.  She severely criticized the plaintiffs’ case, 
                                                
13 Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP, “Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) A new frontier for Canadian 
health care?” Health Law Bulletin (June 2005), 2.  
14 Low, et al., “Failing on the Fundamentals: The Chaoulli Decision.”  
15 Ibid. 
16 Graeme G. Mitchell (G.C.), “‘The Sky is Falling’: An Uncommon Perspective on Chaoulli v. Quebec 
(Attorney General) and its Progeny,” Saskatchewan Legal Education Society Civil Law Charter Update 
(March 2007), 3. 
17 Low, et al., “Failing on the Fundamentals: The Chaoulli Decision.” 
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pronouncing that individual rights to private insurance were superceded by the collective 
rights of the population.18  In November 2001, Chaoulli and Zeliotis appealed their case 
to the Quebec Court of Appeal.  However, their attempts were not rewarding, as all three 
appellate court judges upheld Justice Piche’s decisions in concurrent decisions delivered 
in April 2002.  Justices Delisle and Brossand stated that this was not a “section 7” case, 
inasmuch as economic rather than fundamental human rights were affected.19  
Following this decision, Chaoulli and Zeliotis turned their efforts towards 
Canada’s top court, the Supreme Court of Canada.  In May 2003 they were granted leave 
to appeal, and by this time the case had moved from one man’s lone crusade to a public 
debate about the future of health care in Canada.20  Chaoulli and Zeliotis brought their 
case before the seven justices of the Supreme Court on June 8, 2004.  One year later, on 
June 9, 2005, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment.  In a controversial and narrow 
4:3 decision, the Supreme Court overturned the Quebec courts and ruled in favor of 
Chaoulli, striking down Quebec laws that prohibited the sale of private health insurance 
on the basis that they violate Quebec’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Of the 7 judges, 
3 of them also found these laws to be in violation of section 7 of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.21  Colleen M. Flood notes that as a result there is a prospect that 
comparable laws in other provinces could be struck down.22  Referring to the decision as 
a potential “constitutional coup d’etat on Medicare,”23 D. Martin Low, Q.C., Lydia 
                                                
18 Antonia Maioni and Christopher Manfredi, “When the Charter Trumps Health Care – A Collision of 
Canadian Icons,” Policy Options (September 2005), 53. 
19 Low, et al., “Failing on the Fundamentals: The Chaoulli Decision.” 
20 Maioni and Manfredi.  “When the Charter Trumps Health Care – A Collision of Canadian Icons,” 54. 
21 Colleen M. Flood, “Supreme disagreement: The highest court affirms an empty right,” The Canadian 
Medical Association Journal (CMAJ) (20 June 2005), accessed online at 
http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/rapidpdf/cmaj.050759v1 (Retrieved 2 November 2007). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Low, et al., “Failing on the Fundamentals: The Chaoulli Decision.” 
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Wakulowsky and Geoff Moysa agree that the divided and complex judgment may be the 
genesis of private health insurance in Canada.24 
 
1.3 Focus, Objectives and Research Questions 
When the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in favor of Jacques Chaoulli, a new 
chapter in the debate over Canada’s approach to publicly funded healthcare began. As a 
result of the narrow 4-3 decision, defenders of Canada’s single-payer system argue that 
the court’s decision was like opening Pandora’s Box.  They believe that the Supreme 
Court’s ruling will result in a parallel private system that will siphon health professionals 
from the publicly funded system, in turn reducing the overall quality of healthcare to 
Canadians who cannot afford private insurance.25  However, critics of Canadian 
healthcare welcome the decision to uphold individual rights against a state monopoly, 
recognizing that the demand for health services will often exceed supply, and 
acknowledging the limits of Canadian Medicare.26  
The primary objective of this thesis is to put opinions aside and determine 
whether the Chaoulli decision started a revolution towards privatization that will 
inevitably destroy the public healthcare system as we know it, or whether it was merely a 
wake-up call for governments and citizens devoted to the idea of universal healthcare.27 
In order to achieve this objective, this thesis seeks to address the following research 
questions: 
                                                
24 Mark Kennedy, “Medicare Future at Stake: High Court rule on private-care ban legality,” The National 
Post (Front Page) (8 June 2005), accessed online at http://www.healthcoalition.ca/chaoulli-release.pdf 
(Retrieved 12 December 2007). 
25 Patrick J. Monahan, “Chaoulli v Quebec and the Future of Canadian Healthcare: Patient Accountability 
as the ‘Sixth Principle’ of the Canada Health Act,” (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lecture, 29 
November 2006), Forward. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Steven Lewis, “Medicare’s fate: Are we fiddlers or firefighters?” Winnipeg Free Press (15 June 2005). 
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1. What are the policy implications of Chaoulli v. Quebec? 
2. What are the legal implications of Chaoulli v. Quebec? 
3. What are the constitutional implications of Chaoulli v. Quebec? 
For clarification purposes, the “policy implications” discussed in this thesis 
include any sort of statutory or programmatic reform that was developed in response to 
the Chaoulli decision, and any initiatives undertaken by any interest groups that have the 
potential to affect the development of public policy.  The “legal implications” refer to 
subsequent court challenges in other provinces that attempt to expand the precedent set in 
Chaoulli across Canada, or to use the Chaoulli decision to challenge existing healthcare 
legislation.  The “constitutional implications” address any changes in the way the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms is interpreted, affecting he development of future court 
challenges and subsequent public policy. 
 
1.4 Organization of Thesis 
The policy, legal, and constitutional implications of Chaoulli v. Quebec are 
presented in five subsequent chapters: 
Chapter 2, Understanding Chaoulli – An Analysis of the Decision, clarifies 
exactly what was decided in Chaoulli by examining the three sets of arguments of the 
Supreme Court justices. This analysis provides a necessary foundation for the discussion 
of the policy, legal, and constitutional implications of the decision. 
Chapter 3, Policy Implications of Chaoulli, looks at the development of Chaoulli-
specific policies since the Supreme Court’s decision was handed down on June 2005.  In 
particular, three policy implications are discussed in this chapter.  The first is the 
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examination of a statute passed by Quebec, namely, Bill 33, which was Quebec’s 
response to Chaoulli.  The second is the assessment of a provincial discussion paper, 
Ralph Klein’s “Third Way” proposal, which was Alberta’s response to Chaoulli.  The 
third is the evaluation of a federal-provincial agreement, entitled “Wait Time 
Benchmarks,” which was the Federal government’s response to Chaoulli.   
Chapter 4, Legal Implications of Chaoulli, examines the effect that Chaoulli has 
had on subsequent legal challenges in other provinces.  More specifically, it focuses on 
three “copy-cat” cases.  The first case, Flora v. Ontario ([2007] O.J. No. 91), 
unsuccessfully sought to use the precedent set in Chaoulli to recover lost funds for an 
out-of-country medical treatment.  The second case, Murray v. Alberta (Minister of 
Health), seeks to expand the precedent set in Chaoulli that prohibitions against private 
health insurance violates section 7 the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Likewise, 
McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario (Attorney General), tests whether Ontario healthcare 
laws violate section 7 of the Charter. 
Chapter 5, Constitutional Implications of Chaoulli, discusses the constitutional 
consequences that emerged as a result of the Chaoulli decision.  These ramifications 
include the symbolic elevation of healthcare to a Charter right and the expansion of 
Section 7 of the Charter to healthcare.  This chapter also illustrates how the 
implementation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms set the stage for Chaoulli and 
future judicial activism. 
Chapter 6, Conclusion, broadens the analysis to consider all of the implications of 
the Chaoulli v. Quebec decision for the healthcare system.  It provides insight into the 
future of the Canadian Medicare system and offers suggestions for future research. 
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1.5 Contribution of Thesis 
Due to the controversial nature of the Chaoulli decision, there is a substantial 
amount of literature that interprets the decision and discusses how it could affect the 
Canadian healthcare system.  Most of the literature was written immediately following 
the judgment (June-September 2005), and is merely speculative about the potential 
implications of the decision.   
However, since 2005 there have been a number of policy and legal developments 
that resulted from the Chaoulli decision, such as Bill 33 in Quebec and copycat cases 
such as Flora v. Ontario, Murray v. Ontario and McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario.  
These developments have had a significant impact on the Canadian healthcare system, 
and have not been effectively compiled.  It is also important to discuss and document the 
constitutional implications of Chaoulli, as they are rarely discussed, but have the 
potential to alter the composition of Canada’s political institutions.  Some attention is 
also devoted to discussing the “Americanization” of the Supreme Court of Canada as a 
constitutional consequence of Chaoulli. This topic has not been properly documented in 
post-Chaoulli literature. 
Basing my argument on existing literature, this thesis will make a contribution to 
existing Chaoulli literature by carefully examining the policy, legal, and constitutional 
implications of Chaoulli v. Quebec. In doing so, the implications of Chaoulli will be 
updated in light of recent developments and compiled into one concise thesis. This will 
elicit a better understanding of and clarify the impact that the Chaoulli decision has had 
on the Canadian healthcare and political systems from June 2005 to November 2007.  
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1.6 Methodology 
This thesis is based largely on a content analysis of existing literature. This 
included primary and secondary sources such as government documents, journal articles, 
newspaper articles, books, government-initiated studies, court cases and the judicial 
decision on the case officially known as S.C.R. 791 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney 
General).  Three sources were particularly influential in framing this thesis: Access to 
Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Insurance (Flood et. al; 2006); 
Chaoulli v. Quebec and the Future of Canadian Healthcare: Patient Accountability as 
the “Sixth Principle” of the Canada Health Act (Monahan; 2006); and “The Sky is Not 
Falling”: An Uncommon Perspective on Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) and its 
Progeny (Mitchell; 2007).  It was by reading these three separate, yet interrelated post-
Chaoulli publications that led to the substantive focus of this thesis on the policy, legal, 
and constitutional implications of that historic judicial decision.  
It is important to acknowledge that many of the sources used in the content 
analysis of this thesis were accessed via the Internet.  The use of the World Wide Web 
was essential to this study as many of the government documents that were used in this 
thesis were only available in PDF format.  The wealth of information available through 
the Internet in the form of e-books, scholarly journals, government institutions, and 
private associations contributed greatly to the development of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
UNDERSTANDING CHAOULLI: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
“Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) is perhaps the most extraordinary 
judgment rendered to date by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Twenty-
first Century.”28 –Graeme G. Mitchell, Q.C.  
 
 Chaoulli v. Quebec is widely considered to be one of the most controversial 
decisions in the history of the Supreme Court of Canada.  Patrick J. Monahan, Dean of 
Osgoode Hall Law School, describes reactions to the 4:3 decision that struck down 
prohibitions on the purchase of private health insurance for publicly covered services as 
both striking and remarkable.29  He notes that reactions to the decision ranged from being 
described as “astounding”30 by Hamish Stewart, as “embodying a ‘Two-tier Magna 
Carta’”31 by Gregory P. Marchildon, and as a “Charter calamity waiting to happen”32 by 
Andrew Petter to being “worse than Lochner”33 (a discredited 1905 decision by the U.S. 
Supreme Court that struck down legislation setting maximum work hours in bakeries) by 
Sujit Choudhry.  
                                                
28 Mitchell, “‘The Sky is Falling’: An Uncommon Perspective on Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) 
and its Progeny,” 2.  
29 Monahan, “Chaoulli v Quebec and the Future of Canadian Healthcare: Patient Accountability as the 
‘Sixth Principle’ of the Canada Health Act,” 1. 
30 Hamish Stewart, “Implications of Chaoulli for Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases,” in Access to Care 
Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada, Eds. Flood et al., (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2005), 207. 
31 Gregory P. Marchildon, “The Chaoulli Case: Two Tier Magna Carta?” Healthcare 
Quarterly, 8(4) 2005: 49-52, accessed online at http://www.longwoods.com/product.php?productid 
=17190&page=7 (Retrieved 18 October 2007). 
32 Andrew Petter, “Wealthcare: The politics of the Charter Revisited,” in Access to Care Access to Justice: 
The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada, Eds. Flood et al., (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2005), 120. 
33 Sujit Choudry, “Worse than Lochner.” in Access to Care Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over 
Private Health Insurance in Canada, Eds. Flood et al., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 75. 
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Monahan refers to the Chaoulli decision as a “bombshell” that blindsided 
governments and the health policy community alike.34  He explains that the health policy 
community had little, if any, warning that such an outcome was likely or even possible.  
He characterizes the decision as one that changed the ground rules governing Canada’s 
publicly funded healthcare system, but provided little guidance regarding what those 
changes ought to be. 35    
According to Marlissa Tiedemann (2005), public reactions to Chaoulli range from 
highly optimistic to extremely pessimistic.  Some see the decision as positive, believing 
that it will result in more consumer choice in health care.  Others fear that it puts the 
publicly funded health system in jeopardy.  Tiedemann notes that the latter perspective 
has been popularized by the media in particular: a common journalistic theme is that if 
private insurance is allowed to cover services that are insured by provincial health plans, 
a private parallel system will flourish at the expense of the publicly system.36  Roy 
Romanow (2005) predicts that the Chaoulli decision could “sound the end of medicare 
we know it.”37   
It can be argued that that these contrasting views are the result of different 
interpretations of the significance of the Chaoulli judgment. 38  Thus, it is imperative that 
this thesis clarifies exactly what the Supreme Court decided in the case. To this end, three 
sets of arguments are important: the majority opinion (McLachlin C.J. and Major J. 
                                                
34 Monahan, “Chaoulli v Quebec and the Future of Canadian Healthcare: Patient Accountability as the 
‘Sixth Principle’ of the Canada Health Act,” 2. 
35Ibid., 2-3. 
36 Marlisa Tiedemann, “Health Care at the Supreme Court of Canada II: Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney 
General),” The Library of Parliament Law and Government Division (5 October 2005), 7. 
37 Tracy Tyler, “Romanow fears ‘end of medicare’; Romanow slams health ruling, says buying health care 
violates Charter,” The Toronto Star (17 September 2005). 
38 Monahan, “Chaoulli v Quebec and the Future of Canadian Healthcare: Patient Accountability as the 
‘Sixth Principle’ of the Canada Health Act,” 6. 
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(Bastarche J. concurring)), the dissenting opinion (Binnie and LeBel JJ. (Fish JJ. 
concurring)), and the tie-breaking opinion of Justice Marie Deschamps.  In the following 
chapter, each set of arguments will be summarized and analyzed in order to clarify 
precisely what the court decided and did not decide.  
 
2.2 Overview of the Decision  
 After two unsuccessful challenges before the Quebec Superior Court and the 
Quebec Court of Appeal, Dr. Jacques Chaoulli and George Zeliotis took their case to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  After careful consideration, the Supreme Court decided to 
hear their case, realizing that Chaoulli and Zeliotis’s claim had “legal traction” and thus, 
had serious implications for the future of healthcare in Canada.  The reason it had “legal 
traction” was its dealing with a “medically necessary procedure.” If it had dealt with a 
“non-medically necessary procedure” the Chaoulli case would have had no such traction 
and the Supreme Court probably would not have taken it on.  The rationale being, the 
state does not have a monopoly over elective, “non-medically necessary procedures,” as 
they are permitted, but not insured under the Canada Health Act (CHA).  Therefore, the 
plaintiffs would not have had a reasonable Charter challenge.  However, such a 
monopoly over “medically necessary services”39 was in existence, giving way to a 
serious and legitimate Charter challenge.  With a governmental monopoly and no 
Canadian treatment alternatives available for “medically necessary procedures,” a panel 
of seven Supreme Court justices (McLachlin, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Fish and 
                                                
39 Armine Yalnizyan, “Getting Better Health Care: Lessons from (and for) Canada,” The Canadian Centre 
for Policy Alternatives (4 November 2007), accessed online at http://www.policyalternatives. 
ca/documents/National _Office _Pubs/2006/Getting_Better_Health_Care.pdf (Retrieved April 10 2008). 
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Deschamps) decided to hear Chaoulli and Zeliotis’s appeal, producing three different sets 
of reasoning comprising 135 pages (SCC 35) in the process.   
The majority decision was comprised of two separate sets of reasons.  Chief 
Justice McLachlin and Justices Major and Bastarache held that the prohibition on private 
insurance violates both the Quebec and Canadian Charters.  Justice Deschamps agreed 
that the prohibition violates the Quebec Charter.  However, having found so, she declined 
to decide whether it violated the Canadian Charter.40   
The dissenting justices (Binnie, Lebel and Fish JJ.) held that the ban is valid 
because it is aimed at protecting the public health care system.  Therefore, they 
determined that the prohibition on private insurance did not infringe on either the Quebec 
or Canadian Charters.41  As a result, a slim 4:3 majority struck down the provisions of 
the Quebec Charter that prohibited private health insurance. The particulars of the case 
will be summarized in the following sub-sections. 
 
2.2.1. The Majority Opinion 
 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major argued that the key difficulty in 
Chaoulli was that the government and legislature created a monopoly over medically 
necessary health services and then failed to deliver care in a timely fashion (Justice 
Bastarche concurred).42  Paragraphs 105 and 106 of their decision read as follows: 
 
 
                                                
40 Monahan, “Chaoulli v Quebec and the Future of Canadian Healthcare: Patient Accountability as the 
‘Sixth Principle’ of the Canada Health Act,” 2. 
41 Ibid., 1. 
42 Ibid., 6. 
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105: The primary objective of the Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6, 
is to protect, promote and restore the physical and mental well being of 
residents of Canada and to facilitate reasonable access to health services 
without financial or other barriers (s. 3).  By imposing exclusivity and then 
failing to provide public health care of a reasonable standard within a 
reasonable time, the government creates circumstances that trigger the 
application of s. 7 of the Charter. 43  
 
106: The Canada Health Act, the Health Insurance Act, and the Hospital 
Insurance Act do not expressly prohibit private health services.  However, 
they limit access to private health services by removing the ability to 
contract for private health care insurance to cover the same services 
covered by public insurance.  The result is a virtual monopoly for the 
public health scheme.   The state has effectively limited access to private 
health care except for the very rich, who can afford private care without 
need of insurance.  This virtual monopoly, on the evidence, results in 
delays in treatment that adversely affect the citizen’s security of the 
person.  Where a law adversely affects life, liberty or security of the 
person, it must conform to the principles of fundamental justice. 44   
 
Justices McLachlin and Major observed that the question in the Chaoulli case is 
not whether a two-tier system is preferable to a single-tier system, but rather, is 
essentially this: If the public health system fails to deliver “medically necessary” care in a 
timely manner, does the prohibition on private health insurance violate the section 1 
and/or section 7 right to personal security?45 Observing that access to a waiting list does 
not equate to access to health care, they stated that: 
The prohibition on obtaining private health insurance, while it might be 
constitutional in circumstances where health care services are reasonable 
as to both quality and timeliness, is not constitutional where the public 
system fails to deliver reasonable services.  Life, liberty and security of the 
person must prevail … if the government chooses to act, it must do so 
properly.46 
 
   Interestingly, both the Quebec Superior Court and Quebec Court of Appeal 
decided that the prohibition on private insurance was required to preserve the public 
                                                
43 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 2005 SCC 35. Para. 105.  
44 Ibid., Para. 106. 
45 Ibid., Para. 108-123. 
46 Ibid., Para. 158. 
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healthcare system, and thus, that the violation of the right to life and security of person 
was justified by the principles of fundamental justice.47  However, Justices McLachlin 
and Major dismissed the argument as being a theoretical contention and stated that: 
The evidence adduced at trial establishes that many western democracies 
that do not impose a monopoly on the delivery of health care have 
successfully delivered to their citizens medical services that are superior to 
and more affordable than the services that are presently available in 
Canada. This demonstrates that a monopoly is not necessary or even 
related to the provision of quality public health care.48 
 
The majority acknowledged that accessing private insurance alone might not shorten wait 
times.49  They stated, however, that this was not the concern of the appellants, whose 
only burden was to prove that their right to life, liberty and security had been violated.50 
 
2.2.2 Dissenting Opinions 
 
   Justices Binnie and LeBel (Justice Fish JJ. concurring) declared that the courts 
should not remedy problems with the publicly funded healthcare system.  They believed 
that it was beyond the expertise of judges to determine what constituted a reasonable wait 
for care.51  The dissenting judges noted that in Auton v. British Columbia (2004) the 
courts had an opportunity to determine the scope and nature of “reasonable health 
services,” but failed to do so because the task was too difficult.52  They further observed 
that the majority in the Chaoulli case had the same opportunity, but likewise failed to 
indicate what treatment “within a reasonable time” is, how short a waiting list has to be to 
                                                
47 Jim Simpson, “Supreme Court of Canada rules Quebec government health monopoly violates 
fundamental rights,” The Ontario Medical Association (OMA) (1 July 2005), accessed online at 
http://www.oma.org/Health/medicare/05quebec.asp (Retrieved 13 December 2006). 
48 Chaoulli v. Quebec., Para. 140. 
49 Ibid., Para. 100. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Monahan, “Chaoulli v Quebec and the Future of Canadian Healthcare: Patient Accountability as the 
‘Sixth Principle’ of the Canada Health Act,” 13. 
52 Chaoulli v. Quebec., Para. 163. 
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be “short enough,” or how many MRIs the constitution required.53  In paragraph 163 
Binnie and Lebel indicated that:  
The majority [laid] down no manageable constitutional standard.  The 
public cannot know, nor can judges or governments know, how much 
health care is “reasonable” enough to satisfy s. 7 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (“Canadian Charter”) and s. 1 of the Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12 (“Quebec Charter”).  It is to 
be hoped that we will know it when we see it.54 
 
 The dissenting judges strongly believed that the courts could not and should not 
handle the issue presented in Chaoulli. Their primary concern was that wait times are a 
social issue, not a legal one, and citing R. v. Malmo-Levine (2003), they noted that elected 
politicians are more institutionally equipped to make these sorts of decisions.55  
   Justices Binnie and LeBel also agreed that Quebec’s prohibition against private 
insurance was necessary to ensure the integrity of the current single-tier health system 
and to achieve the objectives of the Canada Health Act.56  They found that there was a 
significant amount of evidence supporting the conclusion that an American-type two-tier 
system of health coverage would negatively affect wait times in the public system.  They 
felt that the evidence presented in Chaoulli was insufficient to support private insurance 
as the appropriate solution.57  In paragraph 176 the dissenting judges said: 
While the existence of waiting times is undoubted, and their management 
a matter of serious public concern, the proposed constitutional right to a 
two-tier health system for those who can afford private medical insurance 
would precipitate a seismic shift in health policy for Quebec.  We do not 
believe that such a seismic shift is compelled by either the Quebec Charter 
or the Canadian Charter.58  
 
                                                
53 Ibid., Para. 163. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., Para. 164-176. 
56 Ibid., Para. 166. 
57 Ibid., Para 181. 
58 Ibid., Para. 176. 
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Finally, the dissenting judges indicated that there was a lack of accurate data 
surrounding wait lists in Canada, as research on this issue has generated contradictory 
and conflicting claims (Romanow Report, at p. 139, and the Kirby Report, vol. 4, at p. 41, 
and vol. 6, at pp. 109-10).59  They also noted weaknesses in Chaoulli’s main argument, 
namely that it was: 
Based largely on generalizations about the public system drawn from 
fragmentary experience, an overly optimistic view of the benefits offered 
by private health insurance, and oversimplified view of the adverse affects 
on the public health system of permitting private sector health services to 
flourish and an overly interventionist view of the role the courts should 
play in trying to supply a “fix” to the failings, real or perceived, of major 
social programs.60  
 
 
 
   2.2.3. The Tie-Breaking Decision 
 
Justice Marie Deschamps decided in favor of the majority.  She observed that, in 
provinces where parallel systems are authorized (i.e. Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, 
P.E.I., and Newfoundland and Labrador), public health services appear to be 
unthreatened by private insurance.61  However, she grounded her decision in the Quebec 
Charter (Sec. 1), while the rest of the majority (McLachlin, Major and Bastarche) 
grounded their decision in the Canadian Charter (Sec. 7).62 Justice Deschamps stated 
that: 
 
 
 
 
                                                
59 Ibid. Para. 217. 
60 Ibid., Para. 169. 
61 Ibid., Para. 74. 
62 Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, “Supreme Court Strikes Down Private Health Care Insurance 
Prohibition in Québec: Chaoulli v. Québec (Attorney General),” (2005), accessed online at 
http://casselsbrock.com/publicationdetail.asp?aid=812 (Retrieved 6 October 2007). 
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In the case of a challenge to a Quebec statute, it is appropriate to look first 
to the rules that apply specifically in Quebec before turning to the 
Canadian Charter, especially where the provisions of the two charters are 
susceptible of producing cumulative effects, but where the rules are not 
identical. Given the absence in s. 1 of the Quebec Charter of the reference 
to the principles of fundamental justice found in s. 7 of the Canadian 
Charter, the scope of the Quebec Charter is potentially broader than that 
of the Canadian Charter, and this characteristic should not be 
disregarded.63  
 
While Justice Deschamps determined that section 1 of the Quebec Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms was breached by the prohibition on private health insurance,64 she 
was silent concerning its impact on section 7 of the Canadian Charter.  She indicated that 
it was unnecessary to address the latter issue, since the appellants had proved 
infringement of their section 1 right to life and personal inviolability.65  
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Major concurred with Justice Deschamps 
concerning section 1 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.66  However, 
they went one step further, adjudging that section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms had also been violated.67  Since Justice Deschamps did not comment on 
whether restrictions against private insurance violated the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, the court was left divided 3-3 on the issue.68  
 If Justice Deschamps had determined that the prohibition against private health 
insurance violated the Canadian Charter, the impact of the Chaoulli would have been 5-
                                                
63Chaoulli v. Quebec., Para. 26-33.  
64 Ibid., Para. 102. 
65 Ibid., Para. 100. 
66 Ibid., Para. 102. 
67 Ibid. 
68 CBC.ca, “Top court strikes down Quebec private health-care ban,” (9 June 2005), accessed online at 
http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/06/09/newscoc-health050609.html (Retrieved 11 October 
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fold because the other five provinces with similar prohibitions (B.C., Alberta, Manitoba, 
Ontario, and Nova Scotia) would have been affected by the decision, not just Quebec.69   
 
2.3 Interpreting the decision: Why Chaoulli is controversial 
 
Jeff A. King properly states that Chaoulli v. Quebec is one of the most 
controversial decisions in the history of the Supreme Court of Canada.70  He indicates 
that it is controversial not only because the Supreme Court of Canada decided that a 
monopoly over health care violated section 1 of the Quebec Charter, but also because the 
Supreme Court failed to determine whether prohibiting private insurance violates section 
7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.   
One reason that the court ended up in a 3-3 deadlock over the issue was because 
the majority failed to define what level of health care is “reasonable” and “sufficient” to 
comply with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  As stated by Binnie and LeBel, the 
majority did not indicate what comprises treatment “within a reasonable time,” how short 
a waiting list has to be to qualify as “short enough,” or how many MRIs the constitution 
required.71  However, even though the majority failed to provide definitive, legally 
binding answers to the questions raised by Binne and LeBel (i.e., what is a treatment 
within a reasonable time?), it is entirely possible that the majority inadvertently 
established a standard of care and created a binding social contract by indicating that 
there is a constitutional right for “timely access” to healthcare under section 7 of the 
                                                
69 Peter J. Carver, “Comment on Chaoulli v. Quebec,” Law and Governance (June 2005), accessed online 
at http://www.longwoods.com/product.php?productid=17191 (Retrieved 22 January 2008). 
70 Jeff A. King, “Constitutional Rights and Social Welfare: A Comment on the Canadian Chaoulli Health 
Care Decision,” Modern Law Review, Vol. 69, No. 4, pp. 631-643 (July 2006), accessed online at 
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71 Chaoulli v. Quebec., Para. 163. 
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Canadian Charter.  But, whether or not this standard exists is just as contentious as 
whether the standard is manageable.  Given the possibility that the general standard set 
by section 7 (“timely access”) could be extended to a point where individuals’ rights are 
constantly being violated, it may be impossible for the government to retain a single tier 
universal health care system that does not violate some individuals’ Charter rights.72  
Nevertheless, that all depends on whether one agrees that a binding social contract exists. 
The majority’s justification for private healthcare is also controversial. Sack 
GoldBlatt and Mitchell LLP (2007) point out that the majority failed to establish a 
rational connection between Quebec’s prohibition on private insurance and the goal of 
maintaining quality public healthcare.73 More specifically, to support the view that a two-
tier healthcare system would improve wait times, the majority relied on a survey of 
European Health Care systems that was included in Senator Kirby’s interim report on 
healthcare. 74  However, they ignored the fact that Senator Kirby rejected the notion that a 
two-tier healthcare system would resolve wait times and did not include that survey in his 
final report.75   
The majority also ignored the trial judge, who concluded that removing the ban on 
private insurance would lead to considerable growth in private health sector at the public 
sector’s expense.76  As Justices Binnie, Lebel, and Fish pointed out: 
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[T]he Kirby Report states flatly that “allowing a private parallel system 
will . . . make the public waiting lines worse” (vol. 4, at p. 42 (emphasis 
added)).  This conclusion is supported by the Romanow Report (p. 139: 
“[P]rivate facilities may improve waiting times for the select few . . . but . 
. . worse[n them for the many]”), the Turcotte Report (pp. 13-14), and the 
expert witnesses at trial (Marmor Report; Wright Report; and Bergman 
Report).77 
 
The Australian experience, as reported by Dr. Wright, is that at present 
delays in the Australian public system are caused largely by surgeons’ 
reluctance to work in public hospitals and by their encouragement of 
patients to use the private system on a preferential basis (Wright Report, at 
p. 15; Hurley, p. 17).78 
 
Theodore R. Marmor, a policy analyst who testified in the Quebec trial on behalf 
of Canada’s Attorney General, found the majority’s treatment of the international 
evidence to be problematic.79  He explains that the majority had no justifiable reasons for 
their conclusions other than the findings of the highly contested Kirby Report.  As this 
report relies on a descriptive rather than causal research design, Marmor suggests that it 
provides “evidence” that is not particularly conclusive.80  Accordingly, he cautions the 
courts from turning to the Chaoulli decision for guidance on the use of cross-national 
research to support judicial decision making.81     
Constitutional expert Francois Beland similarly argues that the majority justices 
based their decision on weak evidence.  He notes that the dissenting judges characterized 
the evidence as unsubstantiated, common sense arguments,82 and suggests that it would 
have been better if they “just threw up their hands and held the debate in a strictly 
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ideological forum.”83  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
            On June 9, 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled 4 to 3 that the ban on private 
insurance for services that are covered under the provincial health plan violates the 
Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and was thus void and unenforceable.84  
All seven justices agreed that the evidence established, in some cases, that the prohibition 
against private health insurance put the personal health and security of Quebecers at 
risk.85  However, the seven justices were unable to see eye to eye on whether or not this 
prohibition violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and/or 
Section 1 of the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. 
Justices McLachlin, Major and Bastarache indicated that while not every waiting 
list case amounts to a violation of section 7, the evidence in Chaoulli demonstrated a 
degree of physical and psychological suffering that jeopardized the “security of 
person.”86  This being so, they concluded that the state monopoly over the provision of 
“medically necessary” services was not legally justified and that the prohibition against 
private health insurance violated section 7 (the right to life and security of person) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Section 1 of the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms (right to life, and to personal security and inviolability).87 
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  Justice Deschamps agreed with Justices McLachlin, Major and Bastarache that 
the prohibition on private health insurance violated section 1 of the Quebec Charter.  
However, she noted that the scope of section 1 of the Quebec Charter was potentially 
broader than section 7 of the Canadian Charter because Quebec’s section 1 did not refer 
to “the principles of fundamental justice.”88  As a result, she found it unnecessary to 
consider arguments based on the Canadian Charter and grounded her decision solely on 
the Quebec Charter.89 Consequently, the decision is technically only applicable to the 
province of Quebec.   
While Justices McLachlin, Major, Bastarache and Deschamps made up the 
majority, agreeing that the state monopoly on healthcare violated section 1 of the Quebec 
Charter, Justices Binnie, LeBel, and Fish disagreed.  Rather, they concurred with Justice 
Ginette Piche (the trial judge) and the three appellate judges who determined that the ban 
on private health insurance did not violate section 1 of the Quebec Charter or section 7 of 
the Canadian Charter.90  Stating that long waiting lists could not be resolved as a matter 
of constitutional law, they were critical of the evidence that the majority used to support 
their arguments (primarily volume three of the Interim Kirby Report).  They also made it 
clear that the courts cannot adequately deal with complex-fact laden policy issues such as 
wait times (in chapter four the effects of the precedent of such judicial activism will be 
discussed). 
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The fact that Chaoulli was decided by a 4:3 split decision is just one reason why 
Chaoulli v. Quebec is widely considered to be the most controversial decision in the 
Supreme Court’s history.  Other reasons include the fact that that the court was left in a 3-
3 deadlock on whether section 7 of the Canadian Charter was violated, the fact that the 
majority failed to define what “reasonable” or “sufficient” care entailed, and the 
argument advanced by Marmor that the court based its decision on inconclusive 
evidence.   
It is easy to get caught up in a debate surrounding the controversial nature of the 
decision.  Regardless of one’s preference for what the Court should have done, however, 
it is important to examine the fallout from what the Court actually decided.  In chapters 
three, four, and five, the policy, legal, and constitutional implications of Chaoulli v. 
Quebec will be discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
CHAPTER 3:  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CHAOULLI 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Responses to the Chaoulli decision were far from uniform.  In chapter two it was 
indicated that the decision was met with shock and surprise by a number of policy and 
legal experts, who referred to it as “astounding,” “worse than Lochner,” and “a political 
and legal bombshell.”  Other experts such as Nadeem Esmail, manager of Health Data 
Systems at the Fraser Institute, were not as surprised as they were thrilled.  In July, 2005 
Esmail wrote A Leap in the Right Direction, which implied that the Chaoulli decision 
was beneficial for Canadians because it favored the introduction of private health 
insurance in Quebec (and potentially other provinces in the future).  According to Esmail, 
the ban on private insurance and payment for healthcare is illegitimate and should not 
continue because a parallel private health sector, running in competition with the public 
sector, would lead to higher quality and more responsive health care in Canada.91  
In spite of a few optimistic opinions such as Esmail’s, the Chaoulli decision was 
met mainly with shock and awe.  Given that the public healthcare system is considered to 
be one of Canada’s most admired and politically-sensitive institutions, most provinces 
and political leaders attempted to downplay the implications of the case.92  Timothy 
Caufield notes that then Manitoba Minister of Health, Tim Sale, responded to the 
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Chaoulli decision by vowing to fight tooth and nail for the universal healthcare system in 
concert with other provinces like Quebec and Saskatchewan.93   
Despite attempts by political leaders to minimize the potential fallout from the 
case, there were still a number of implications that resulted from the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision. Perhaps the most evident implication of Chaoulli is that it 
reinvigorated an intense public debate, which in turn spawned statutory and 
programmatic reform (policy developments) by Quebec (Bill 33), Alberta (The Third 
Way), and the Federal Government (Wait Time Benchmarks).94 Furthermore, increased 
public debate rejuvenated the “pro-privatization” camp,95 which produced a number of 
“copy-cat” cases that aimed to expand the Chaoulli precedent across Canada.   
Both policy and legal implications are important to discuss in order to fully 
understand the impact that the Chaoulli judgment has had on the Canadian healthcare 
system.  For simplicity, the following section of this chapter will discuss the policy 
implications of Chaoulli, namely Bill 33, The “Third Way” proposal, and Wait Time 
Benchmarks.   
 
3.2 Quebec’s Response: Bill 33 
 
In Chaoulli, the Supreme Court gave Quebec one year to amend its healthcare 
legislation and rectify the violation of the Quebec Charter.  However, the government of 
Quebec seriously contemplated invoking the “notwithstanding clause” (Section 33 of the 
Canadian Charter which provides an override to sections 2 and 5 to 15 of the Canadian 
                                                
93 Ibid. 
94 Mitchell, “‘The Sky is Falling’: An Uncommon Perspective on Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) 
and its Progeny,” 25. 
95 Caulfield, “Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General): The Supreme Court of Canada Deals a Blow to 
Publicly Funded Health Care.”  
 28 
Charter) in an attempt to maintain the status quo and avoid legislative reforms that could 
potentially harm the public healthcare system.  Given that Quebec has used the 
notwithstanding clause in the past, invoking it on a number of occasions to protect the 
French language and collective identity of Quebec, many assumed it would be a natural 
response to Chaoulli. 96   
However, to the surprise of many, the Quebec National Assembly refrained from 
using one of its most powerful political tools in the context of the Chaoulli decision.  
Political scientists, legal scholars, and constitutional experts were among the few not 
taken aback by the decision.  Constitutional and legal expert Christopher P. Manfredi 
explains that the government of Quebec had good reason to abstain from its use in 
Chaoulli, as it would have undermined the Canadian Charter.  He suggests that doing so 
would have been political suicide, as the Charter is largely considered to be the “final 
word” in 21st Century political debates.97 Further, the notwithstanding clause may not 
have provided Quebec with complete protection against court action, as the Chaoulli 
decision was, in large part, based on the Quebec Charter and thus would not have been 
covered under Section 33 of the Canadian Charter.   
Since the government of Quebec failed to invoke the notwithstanding clause, it 
was obligated to respond to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chaoulli.  Quebec took 
legislative action on June 15, 2006, by setting out proposed amendments to its healthcare 
legislation with the tabling of Bill 33, titled “an Act to amend the Act respecting health 
services and social services and other legislative provisions.”  On December 13, 2006, the 
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Quebec legislature passed Bill 33 as a means of addressing unreasonable wait times for 
some services by opening the door to private medical services and private health 
insurance (but only to a limited extent).98 Davis LLP indicates that Bill 33 implements 
two interrelated solutions: 
1) A six-month wait-time guarantee that applies to some elective surgeries (as 
defined by regulation but limited to hip, knee and cataract procedures) [which] 
provides patients not treated within the prescribed wait time of six months an 
opportunity to have their procedure performed in another establishment or a 
specialized clinic affiliated with the public sector.  If the wait-time exceeds nine 
months, patients may have their operation performed outside Quebec or Canada, 
or by private providers, and the full cost of the surgery is covered by the 
provincial health care insurance plan.99 
 
2) The right to duplicative private insurance for the elective surgeries targeted in  
(1) provided health services are obtained from doctors who have opted out of the  
Provincially insured Medicare system.100 
 
Marie-Claude Premont explains that Bill 33 legalizes private hospitals called 
“Specialized Medical Centres” (for overnight and day surgery), private clinics, and 
private insurance. 101   Under Bill 33 there are two types of proposed private hospitals: 
1) Hospitals where services are paid for by taxpayers and will become a “private 
extension” of current public hospitals that will become known as “Associated 
Medical Clinics.” 102 In essence, public services are simply contracted out to “for-
profit private corporations.”103 
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2) Hospitals where services will have to be paid for “out of pocket.”  Premont 
explains that, “this hospital will be staffed by opted-out physicians who … will be 
able to offer (legally) authorized surgical services including overnight bed stay.” 
These “Specialized Medical Centres” are restricted in what surgeries they can 
perform (they can only perform surgeries that are specified by the government). 
They are presently restricted to knee replacements, hip replacements and cataract 
surgery, however, the list can be extended in the future by “simple regulatory 
changes by the Minister of Health.” 104  
 
      Like the Chaoulli decision, Bill 33 has left people divided on whether it will 
improve or dismantle the public system.  Dr. Nicolas Duval, an orthopedic surgeon from 
Montreal, argues that the public system will benefit from private clinics because they will 
reduce demands on public resources.105  However, Dr. Simon Turcotte, the spokesperson 
for the recently established Médecins pour l'accès à la santé (Doctors for healthcare 
access), argues that expanding the private sector will split doctors between the separate 
public and private systems, which will lead to further staffing shortages in the public 
system and put poorer patients at risk.106   
Dr. Turcotte also believes that Bill 33 fails to address the underlying problem that 
prompted the Chaoulli case: that the public hospital is inefficient, outdated, and unable to 
incorporate contemporary practice methods to keep up with demand.  Rather than trying 
to fix problems with the public hospital system, he believes that Bill 33 merely identifies 
a point at which the system falters and sends the overflow to private hospitals and clinics.  
According to Dr. Turcotte, hospitals should use their own resources to fund publicly-
owned ambulatory clinics rather than subcontracting the work out to the private sector.107 
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In introducing Bill 33, the official position of the government of Quebec is that 
the private provision of healthcare will complement rather than compete with the publicly 
funded system.108  As Yu-Sung Soh points out, the Act allows the Minister of Health to 
authorize the use of the private system if wait times in the public system become 
untenable.109   
Despite this, proponents of universal healthcare are still skeptical about Bill 33’s 
intentions and feel it is the beginning of the end. As Antonia Maioni, Director of the 
McGill Institute for the Study of Canada, points out, the government of Quebec left the 
door open for expanding the role of the private clinics, which could make the option of 
“going solo” more attractive for doctors in the future.110  Ultimately, she argues only time 
can tell whether Bill 33 is a limited solution to address problems raised in Chaoulli v. 
Quebec, or whether it laid the groundwork for a two-tier healthcare system in Canada. 111 
 
3.3 Alberta’s Response: Ralph Klein’s “Third Way” 
Although most provincial governments tried to downplay the implications of 
Chaoulli, Alberta Premier Ralph Klein embraced the decision.  On July 30, 2005, Klein 
stated that: 
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There can be little doubt that the Supreme Court of Canada decision has 
forever changed our health-care landscape. The challenge now is to 
embrace the change -- not to run from it. The challenge is to look at the 
ruling as an opportunity, and not as a threat.112   
 
According to Klein, the answer to Canada’s ailing health care system was not more 
money, but rather, more choice, which could be found in a supplementary insurance plan 
(two-tier system).113  Klein’s government responded to Chaoulli by proposing a new 
health policy framework in February, 2006 that called for ten new directions of reform.114  
The 2006 Policy Framework became known as “The Third Way,” because it proposed a 
limited two-tiered system where doctors would be able to practice in both the public and 
private systems and patients would be able to pay for cataract surgery, hip replacements, 
and knee replacements.115  
Gerard W. Boychuk, a political science professor at the University of Waterloo, 
notes that Klein’s “Third Way” proposal was greeted with fanfare, if not hysteria, by the 
media.  His summary of responses to the report noted that it marked “the beginning of the 
end of medicare as practiced today in Canada,” signified “the end of the Canada Health 
Act, at least as conventionally interpreted,” and represented “the end of the guarantee that 
only need, and never wealth, will determine who gets served first.”116  There are two 
main reasons for these claims: 
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1) The third way proposal sought to develop a two-tier healthcare system; 
2) The clause that would allow doctors to concurrently work in both the public 
and private systems conflicted with the fifth principle of the Canada Health 
Act (CHA), which ensures Accessibility (See Appendix C for more details 
about the Canada Health Act).117 
Health care policy experts and federal officials were especially concerned that the 
proposal violated the CHA.  In a three-page letter to Klein, Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper argued that Klein’s “Third Way” proposal could legitimize queue-jumping and 
undermine public health care in rural Alberta by luring rural doctors to urban centres.118  
Federal Health Minister Tony Clement responded to the proposal by indicating that the 
Federal Government would not support health care reforms that violated the CHA.  He 
warned the province of Alberta that it risked forfeiting as much as $1.75 billion in health 
transfers if it went ahead with the proposal without Ottawa’s consent.119 
Klein argued that Alberta had a legal and constitutional basis for the proposal by 
citing a study by the Montreal Economic Institute (MEI), which indicated that the “Third 
Way” did not violate the CHA.120  However, the proposal died in April 2006 after Klein 
received only 55% of delegate support in the review of his leadership at the annual 
Progressive Conservative Party Meeting.121 The rejection of Klein’s “Third Way” 
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proposal indicated that, for the time being, Albertans were satisfied with the public 
system and did not desire private treatment alternatives.  Alberta Health Minister Iris 
Evans announced that Alberta was not ready to proceed with private insurance at that 
time.  However, she implied that the province would be prepared for private medicare in 
the near future.122   
While critics of private medicare hailed the decision to reject the “Third Way” as 
a victory, Harvy Voogd of the lobby group “Friends of Medicare,” contended that public 
health proponents should not be too relieved.  He characterized healthcare privatization in 
Alberta as a zombie, implying that it was an issue that would keep coming back to life.123  
In fact, the resurrection occurred much more quickly than was expected.  On September 
8, 2006, just five months after the “Third Way” died, Murray v. Alberta emerged.  The 
implications of Murray v. Alberta and other ‘copycat cases’ will be discussed in chapter 
four. 
 
3.4 The Federal Response: Wait Time Benchmarks 
 
Along with the majority of the provinces, Prime Minister Paul Martin (2003-
2006) attempted to downplay the implications of Chaoulli. He indicated that the decision 
would not become the “thin edge of the wedge” in terms of establishing differing levels 
of health care for different socioeconomic sectors.124  Martin told reporters on June 9, 
2005 that the federal government would not permit the development of a two-tier health-
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care system in Canada, but rather, would work on strengthening the existing public 
system.125 
Martin and Health Minister Ujjal Dosanjh insisted that the federal government 
would stand behind and continue to invest in the single-payer system.  On August 15, 
2005, Dosanjh told the CMA that the $41 billion in additional financing dedicated to 
health care reform under the 10-year Plan to Strengthen Health Care published in 2004 
would solve the problem of waiting lists that was raised in Chaoulli.126 Dosanjh also 
indicated that the development of evidence-based benchmarks for “medically acceptable” 
wait times in five priority areas would be determined by the first ministers by December 
31, 2005, with the goal of reducing wait times and improving the publicly funded 
system.127 
On December 12, 2005 the first ministers developed ten key benchmarks that 
attempted to reduce wait times for “medically necessary services.”  Based on extensive 
research and clinical evidence, the provinces and territories indicated that they would 
strive to achieve the following benchmarks: 
 Radiation therapy to treat cancer within four weeks of patients being ready for 
treatment; 
 Hip fracture fixation within 48 hours; 
 Hip replacements within 26 weeks; 
 Knee replacements within 26 weeks; 
 Surgery to remove cataracts within 16 weeks for patients who are at high risk; 
 Breast cancer screening for women aged 50 to 69 every two years; and 
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 Cervical cancer screening for women aged 18 to 69 every three years after two 
normal tests; 
 Cardiac bypass surgery within 2 weeks for Level I patients; 
 Cardiac bypass surgery within 6 weeks for Level II patients;  
 Cardiac bypass surgery within 26 weeks for Level III patients.128 
 
At the time the benchmarks were released, campaigning was well underway for 
the upcoming federal election scheduled for January 23, 2006, and the issue of wait times 
had become a key issue.  Although the wait-time guarantees set by the first ministers 
were only goals and not legally enforceable, Conservative leader Stephen Harper came 
close to making such a commitment in his campaign in a promise to preserve the public 
system.129  Harper told reporters that no patient would have to suffer an unacceptable 
wait for treatment under a Conservative government.  He indicated that patients would be 
provided with the option of being treated in another hospital or even a private clinic 
outside of their province if they were not treated within an acceptable period of time.130  
Harper followed Martin’s lead, indicating that all patients would be treated equally 
regardless of income, and that there would be no private, parallel system.131 However, 
unlike Martin, Harper and the Conservative Party did not speak out against private 
initiatives that were underway in Alberta, BC, and Quebec.132 
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Harper won the election and was sworn in as Canada’s 22nd Prime Minister on 
February 6, 2006.  Contrary to his promises that there would be no private, parallel 
system, Harper took his first steps towards such a system just two weeks after he was 
sworn in, praising Quebec’s motion to allow a limited role for private delivery and 
private insurance (Quebec’s Response to Chaoulli: Bill 33).  Describing Quebec’s model 
as one that would effectively address the healthcare access problems, Harper told CTV 
that guaranteed wait times were likewise a priority for his government.133   
Despite Harper’s election promise to reduce wait times, the issue slipped off the 
federal government’s radar screen by July 2006.  Paul Wells notes that Prime Minister 
Harper replaced the Conservative’s fifth campaign priority of “work[ing] with the 
provinces to establish a Patient Wait Times Guarantee” with the more general goal of 
“strengthening our country.”134 
Wells indicated that the reason for this was simple: the Harper government’s 
health care policy was based on Paul Martin’s 2004 healthcare deal with the provinces 
which sought to measure and shorten wait times.  However, unlike Martin’s deal, Harper 
wanted the deadlines to be met without any additional federal funding, forcing the 
provinces to provide more services than they initially agreed to.135  Harper justified the 
change on the basis that he was satisfied with the progress being made by Minister Tony 
Clement concerning the wait-times guarantee.136  
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On April 4, 2007, Harper told the press that he had fulfilled his election promise 
to establish Wait Time Guarantees across Canada.137  At an Ottawa wait times 
conference, he reported that all ten provinces and three territories agreed to establish 
Patient Wait Times Guarantees by 2010.  Under the yet-to-be crafted guarantee, Harper 
indicated that Canadians would be guaranteed “timely access” to health care in cancer 
care, hip and knee replacement, cardiac care, diagnostic imaging, cataract surgeries and 
primary care. He also announced that the Wait Time Guarantees would be supported by 
the 2007 Budget, which would set aside $612 million for the Patient Wait Times 
Guarantee Trust and $30 million for wait time pilot projects. 138    
William P. Georgas and Lynne Golding consider the establishment of these 
benchmarks to be an important response to Chaoulli, because they could give the courts 
guidance in determining future health-related cases.  However, they note that these 
benchmarks are not likely to be immune from judicial scrutiny, regardless of how well 
thought out they may be.139  Georgas and Golding explain that because section 7 of the 
Charter protects individuals from physical and psychological harm, there may be cases in 
which a person’s right to security of person is violated even though a wait time falls 
within the established benchmark.  Although they acknowledged that the benchmarks 
may not be the final word on what the courts consider to be “acceptable” for the timely 
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delivery of healthcare, they argued that the benchmarks could help prevent the 
development of private insurance.140  
Nonetheless, critics argue that the wait time deal falls short of Harper’s 2006 
election promise and leaves the door open to the development of private alternatives.   
Dr. Chris Simpson of the Canadian Cardiovascular Society warns that focusing 
exclusively on wait times is myopic, as other aspects of medicare may be compromised 
in the process.141  Dr. Brian Day, president of the Canadian Medical Association (CMA), 
agrees, and indicates that more health care professionals are needed to make the wait time 
guarantees effective.  Day told CTV’s Mike Duffy that benchmarks and standards are of 
little use if there is a shortage of professionals to deliver the service.142  A number of 
critics feel that the federal government needs to respond to Chaoulli with the same level 
of urgency as individual hospitals and health districts, many of which have increased 
efficiency through micro-level structural, functional, and procedural reform in an attempt 
to maintain an adequate standard of care.143   
However, despite a much needed cash injection of $41 billion in additional 
financing dedicated to healthcare reform in 2004 (pre-Chaoulli) under the 10-year Plan 
to Strengthen Health Care, the establishment of Wait-Time Guarantees remains the 
federal government’s only response to wait times since Chaoulli.  In a 2005 interview, 
the Honorable Roy Romanow warned politicians not to wait for the next court decision 
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before acting.144 However, it appears that the federal government has done just that.   
With two copycat cases on the horizon, the implications of policy inaction by the federal 
government may be more substantial than any policy action could have been. In chapter 
four, the legal responses to Chaoulli, including three court challenges, will be discussed 
and analyzed.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The statutory and programmatic responses to Chaoulli by Quebec, Alberta, and 
the federal government clearly illustrate the impact that the 2005 case has had on 
healthcare policy.  Zolton Naggy, Executive Vice President of the Canadian Independent 
Medical Clinics Association (CIMCA), captures the essence of the argument in this 
chapter by stating that the Supreme Court’s decision has far reaching implications and 
sends a clear message to governments: where wait times are concerned, “change or be 
changed.”145  
In Quebec, the Chaoulli decision resulted in an unprecedented change in 
healthcare legislation.  With the implementation of Bill 33, Quebec altered the way 
healthcare is financed and provided, thereby opening the door to private healthcare 
initiatives.  University of Toronto Law Professor, Marie Claude Premont, believes that 
Bill 33 fundamentally altered core principles of Quebec’s approach to healthcare, laying 
the foundation on which two-tier healthcare can and will gradually develop.146  However, 
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it is equally possible that that Bill 33 is just a tailored solution to address the problems 
that were raised in Chaoulli.  As Yu-Sung Soh points out, private insurance in Quebec is 
limited to certain specialized medical treatments (presently hip/knee replacements and 
cataract surgery).147 
Patrick J. Monahan feels that Bill 33 alone is an inadequate response to the issues 
raised in Chaoulli.  In September 2007, he predicted that if governments fail to deal with 
these issues in a more direct, responsive and real way, healthcare reform may be activated 
and achieved by way of the judicial process instead.148  
The fact that the federal government’s establishment of “Wait Time Benchmarks” 
is the only other response to Chaoulli attests to Monahan’s claim that governments have 
maintained the status quo in the post-Chaoulli era.  Monahan’s argument carries 
considerably more weight when one considers the potential impact of Chaoulli “copycat 
cases” and increasing support for private healthcare initiatives.  The progressionism of 
the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) is just one example of a private organization 
that has begun to support private healthcare alternatives in the post-Chaoulli era.  
When Chaoulli v. Quebec was released in 2005, then CMA president, Dr. Albert 
Schumacher, issued a press release to the effect that CMA policy would continue to 
support and work to improve the publicly funded system.149  However, just over two 
years later, in August 2007, the CMA’s General Council (some 248 delegates 
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representing approximately 63,000 physicians) approved motions that called for private 
alternatives.  These included a call to remove existing bans that prevent doctors from 
practicing concurrently in the private and public sectors or from “opting out” provided 
they do not “bail en masse.”150  Dr. Collins-Nakai reacted to the motions thus: 
The [motions] reflect the frustration doctors are feeling as they try to 
provide timely, quality care to patients. This frustration is driving 
physicians to ask [the] CMA to leave no stone unturned in providing 
access to better health and better care [including] private options as one 
possible mechanism to reduce wait-times.151 
 
Moreover, Dr. Brian Day, a nationally renowned supporter of privately funded 
health care, referred to by his detractors as “Dr. Profit” and “the Darth Vader of health 
care,” was elected president of the CMA in August 2007.152  Many organizations, such as 
the Canadian Taxpayers Federation and Canadian Independent Medical Clinics 
Association, welcomed Dr. Day’s arrival as CMA president.  Neil Desai, the Ontario 
Director for the Canadian Taxpayers Federation, believes that the election of Day 
demonstrates that the CMA is serious about improving the ailing Canadian health care 
system.153  Zoltan Naggy agrees, and suggests that the decision by Canada’s physicians to 
elect Dr. Day CMA president is consistent with growing public support for an increased 
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role for the private sector.154  He called Day’s appointment a “great step toward health 
care choice and patient-centered care in Canada.” 155  
Despite growing support for private initiatives, the Chaoulli decision has not yet 
precipitated a dramatic shift in health policy.156  The belief that the Chaoulli decision was 
the beginning of the end of universal healthcare is still more of a myth than a reality.  In 
actuality, most Canadians still desire a publicly funded healthcare system.  An Ipsos-Reid 
poll released on August 5, 2005 showed that 77% of Canadians favour a well-run, 
adequately funded, public health care system over a private pay/insurance option.157 
Moreover, the rejection of Ralph Klein’s “Third Way” proposal is evidence of this claim.  
Because of its unwillingness and/or inability to rule that a parallel health care 
system is constitutionally mandated, Graeme G. Mitchell, Q.C. indicates that the Court 
has thrown the matter back into the political and governmental arena.158 However, if 
governments do not make swift changes to the public system in a timely manner the 
emergence of a two-tier system could become a reality.  If this does not occur from the 
Chaoulli decision directly, it is likely to be the result of copycat cases such as Murray v. 
Alberta or McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario, which are discussed in chapter four.   
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CHAPTER 4:  
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHAOULLI: 
POST-CHAOULLI JURISPRUDENCE 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Following the release of the Chaoulli decision, then Prime Minister Paul Martin 
and Justice Minister Irwin Cottler insisted that the ruling did not jeopardize medicare 
because it only applies in a provincial context.159  However, lawyers disagreed, in 
anticipation of comparable lawsuits in other provinces where duplicate private insurance 
is prohibited.160  Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP (2005) note that although the decision 
may technically apply only to the Province of Quebec, it still has the potential to 
transform Canada’s public health care system because three of the seven Supreme Court 
Justices agreed that the Canadian Charter was violated.161  Michele Warner explains that 
because the court did not impose any positive obligations to provide healthcare within a 
specific time, difficult cases can be expected in the future.162  Some firms, such as the 
Canadian Taxpayers Federation (CTF), even encouraged people to come forward and 
challenge similar laws.   
Further, Tracey Tremayne-Lloyd of the Health Law Group at Gardiner Roberts 
LLP, anticipated that Chaoulli may be a boon for the “business of health,” including 
those involved in corporate and commercial lawyering.  For example, legal expertise 
would be needed to structure, implement and enforce new health care delivery 
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mechanisms, particularly in the areas of public/private investments and partnerships in 
the health sector.163 
In light of this new interest, a wave of legal challenges has been initiated across 
Canada.  Sam Solomon, of the National Review of Medicine, found that within eighteen 
months after it was handed down the Chaoulli decision had already been cited in 31 cases 
in almost every province.164  Most of these cases aim at reducing public wait times and 
improving public financing and care, rather than seeking freer access to private medical 
services.  Few precedents have been set where the application of the Chaoulli case has 
been considered.165 However, three cases have been initiated (one in Alberta and two in 
Ontario) that attempt to determine some of the Charter issues that were left outstanding 
by the Supreme Court in Chaoulli.166  These three cases, that have the potential to apply 
the Chaoulli v. Quebec precedent across Canada, include: Flora v. Ontario, Murray v. 
Alberta, and McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario.  Each of them is discussed in turn below. 
 
4.2 Flora v. Ontario ([2007] O.J. No. 91) 
 
Adolfo Flora, an Ontario resident, was diagnosed with advanced liver cancer and 
needed a living-related liver transplant (LRLT) to extend his life.  The Ontario Health 
Insurance Plan (OHIP) did not authorize his surgery, classifying his treatment as “too 
high risk” given the advanced stage of cancer.  With no alternative treatments, Mr. Flora 
flew to England in 2001 to undergo surgery, which cost him $450,000.  The surgery was 
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a success, and when he returned to Canada, he appealed to the OHIP review board.  His 
appeal was unsuccessful, so he took the case to the Divisional Court of Ontario.167  
As reported by Graeme G. Mitchell, Mr. Flora advanced three arguments to the 
court.  First, he argued that the Ontario Health Services Review Board incorrectly 
interpreted section 28.4(a) of Ontario’s Health Insurance Regulations (See Appendix D to 
view section 28.4 of the Ontario Health Insurance Plan).  This section allows for the 
reimbursement of out-of-jurisdiction medical expenses, provided the services received 
are medically necessary and are considered an acceptable treatment within the 
jurisdiction.168  Second, he contended that the Board did not interpret section 28.4 in a 
manner consistent with section 7 of the Charter.  Third, he alleged that section 28.4 itself 
is inconsistent with section 7 of the Charter.169   
Mr. Flora argued that the government, having chosen to provide universal health 
care, was required to do so in a manner that complies with the Charter.  Since section 
28.4(2) does not provide payment for a person who needs out-of-country medical 
treatment in order to save his life, it violates that person’s right to life.  Mr. Flora said he 
had to choose between impending death and funding his own care.170  Despite Mr. Flora’s 
constitutional claims that state inaction violated his section 7 rights, the Divisional Court 
rejected each of his assertions and unanimously dismissed his application for judicial 
review.171  
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In rejecting the claim, Epstein J. (the Ontario Divisional Court Judge) found that 
OHIP’s reasons for denying coverage to Mr. Flora were reasonable because the LRLT for 
Mr. Flora was “too risky,” and thus, not generally accepted as appropriate for a person in 
his situation.172  Epstein J. also cited Chaoulli, noting that OHIP’s denial of funding did 
potentially threaten Mr. Flora’s personal security, as it could have both physical and 
psychological consequences.173  Despite this, Epstein J. ascertained that Mr. Flora’s claim 
ultimately failed because, even though his section 7 rights might be infringed, the 
financial burden on the state cannot be limitless.174 
Flora v. Ontario is significant to Chaoulli because of the distinctions that 
Divisional Court of Ontario was able to draw between the two cases.  Epstein J. found 
that since Ontario regulations do not prohibit people from procuring out-of-jurisdiction 
medical services on their own dime, the public system cannot be obligated to provide 
every life-saving service that may be possible.175  According to Kathy O’Brien, Epstein’s 
decision supports the Chaoulli decision in establishing that all Canadians have the right 
to privately obtain any health services that the public health care system does not make 
“reasonably available,” and any legislation that prohibits such a right violates the 
Canadian Charter.176   
Graeme G. Mitchell points out that the fundamental issue in Flora v. Ontario is 
whether the Charter demands that all life saving medical treatment be publicly funded. 
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While the judgment suggests that doing so is not a constitutional imperative, Mitchell 
suggested that OHIP still faced a moral dilemma: that it should reconsider its denial of 
Flora’s claim because of the effective outcome of his treatment.177  However, as judicial 
supremacy increases in the post-Charter era, being a constitutional dilemma may not be a 
problem for the courts as they proceed into the realm of public policy following the 
Chaoulli decision.  In chapter five Chaoulli and the issue of judicial supremacy in the 
post-Charter era will be discussed. 
 
4.3 Murray v. Alberta (Minister of Health) 
 
Bill Murray, a 57-year-old Chartered Accountant from Calgary, suffered from 
severe osteoarthritis in his left hip.  After enduring the pain for over a year he consulted 
with a specialist, who recommended that Birmingham hip resurfacing surgery was the 
best medical option to relieve his pain and enable him to return to an “active lifestyle.”  
Mr. Murray was denied the surgery by the government of Alberta because he was, 
at age 57, “too old” to enjoy the benefits of this surgery (if he had been younger than 55 
the surgery would have been permitted).178  Since private medical insurance was 
prohibited under Alberta law (similar to Quebec prior to Bill 33), Mr. Murray had no 
option but to pay out-of-pocket for this medically necessary surgery.179  
Although the surgery was a success, not long afterwards Mr. Murray began to 
experience worsening pain in his right hip.  Once again Mr. Murray went to see a 
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specialist, who also recommended Birmingham hip resurfacing. This time the Alberta 
government went so far as to deny him the in-province surgery, even if he paid for it 
himself.  Mr. Murray eventually received treatment in Montreal and is now back to a 
“healthy lifestyle.” 180  
In August 2006, Mr. Murray commenced a lawsuit, challenging provisions in the 
Alberta Health Care Insurance Act that prohibit private health insurance for publicly 
funded services.181  In the suit, he claimed that his section 7 Charter rights had been 
violated, inasmuch as the Alberta government failed to provide him “timely access to 
necessary medical treatment,” while also disallowing him from accessing private 
insurance to cover the cost of treatment in the private sector.182  
Mr. Murray’s goal in launching the court challenge is to expand the Chaoulli 
decision across Canada and help Canadians avoid preventable physical and emotional 
harm. 183  John Carpay, Executive Director of the Canadian Constitution Foundation, 
notes that in the Chaoulli decision, Justice Deschamps described the courts as the 
citizenry’s last line of defence to under-responsive government action.184  Carplay states 
that this description has proven to be prophetic in the case of Bill Murray.185 
Although Murray v. Alberta is still in its preliminary stages, Cassels Brock & 
Blackwell LLP (2007) expect that the case, no matter what the decision, will be appealed 
to the Alberta Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court of Canada because of what is 
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at stake. 186  They believe that the legal ramifications of Murray v. Alberta are likely to 
exceed Chaoulli v. Quebec primarily because: 
1) Murray v. Alberta is a class action lawsuit, which means that whatever 
the courts decide in the case will affect all Albertans that find 
themselves in a situation that is similar to Mr. Murray’s situation, not 
only Mr. Murray directly (as in the Chaoulli case). 187 
 
2) The premise of Mr. Murray’s case is based on a breach of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms rather than a breach of a 
provincial law (i.e. Quebec Charter).  As a result, the courts will have 
to determine whether or not Alberta’s health legislation violated the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (this was not clear in Chaoulli v. 
Quebec because of Justice Deschamps’ decision that left the court in a 
deadlock). 188 
 
 
 
4.4 McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario (Attorney General) 
 
 Lindsay McCreith, a 66 year old retired auto body shop owner from Newmarket, 
Ontario, was told in early 2006 that he had a brain tumor.  Mr. McCreith was told that the 
tumor did not have to be immediately treated, and was informed that he would have to 
wait four and a half months to get an MRI appointment to find out if the tumor was 
cancerous.  Unwilling to wait four months for an MRI and risk further progression of the 
tumor, Mr. McCreith arranged to have an MRI conducted in Buffalo for a cost of about 
$500.  Unfortunately, the MRI found that the tumor was malignant.189   
With the diagnosis in hand, Mr. McCreith attempted to schedule an appointment 
with a neurosurgeon in Ontario.  However, even with the diagnosis, Mr. McCreith was 
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told that he would have to wait three months just to get an appointment.190  According to 
McCreith’s family doctor, he would have had to wait an estimated eight months to get 
surgery.191  Fearful that eight months was enough time for a cancer to spread and 
progress to an irreversible stage, Mr. McCreith returned to Buffalo to have the cancerous 
brain tumor removed in March of 2006.192  
 Lindsay McCreith is convinced that he would be dead today had he not paid the 
$27,600 ($U.S.) to obtain the surgery privately.  Mr. McCreith told the Canadian 
Constitution Foundation that he was pursuing this lawsuit to prevent other citizens from 
suffering the dire consequences of waiting list purgatory.193 
Shona Holmes, a 43-year-old self-employed family mediator and married mother 
of two, had a similar experience with the Ontario healthcare system.194  In March 2005, 
Ms. Holmes began to experience anxiety attacks, extreme fatigue, weight gain, high 
blood pressure, and extreme headaches.195  She looked to the Ontario healthcare system 
for answers and assistance.  She ended up waiting seven weeks for an MRI, which 
revealed that she had an 8-9 mm brain tumor, four months for a consultation with a 
neurologist, and six months for a consultation with an endocrinologist (a doctor who 
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specializes in the system of the body which releases hormones into the blood stream).196  
Frustrated with long wait times and progressive vision loss, Ms. Holmes went to 
the Mayo Clinic in Arizona to get a diagnosis regarding her tumor.  After extensive 
testing, several specialists (including an endocrinologist, a neurologist and a 
neurosurgeon, who is licensed to practice in Ontario) determined that a Rathke’s cleft 
cyst was causing hormone and vision problems. 197  They indicated that if the tumor was 
not removed, she could risk permanent blindness and death.198  
Armed with the diagnosis, Ms. Holmes attempted to receive treatment in Ontario, 
but was told that she would have to wait for more appointments and tests.  Unwilling to 
wait, Ms. Holmes decided to go back to the Mayo Clinic to have the tumor removed.  The 
surgery was a success, and within ten days, Ms. Holmes’ vision was completely restored. 
A post-operative MRI and visual field testing confirmed that the tumor had caused the 
vision loss.199  Candice Chan notes that the cost for Holmes to obtain her diagnosis and 
treatment was in excess of $95,000.200 
Neither Mr. McCreith nor Ms. Holmes received compensation from the Ontario 
Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) for seeking “medically necessary” treatment.  Together, 
McCreith and Holmes are arguing that Ontario legislation unduly limits competition and 
therefore supply in healthcare, which deprives Ontarions of their right to health, life and 
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liberty as guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter.201  They further argue that the 
Government’s monopoly over essential healthcare services forced them to seek care 
abroad, which caused them significant financial, emotional, and physical hardship. 202  In 
September 2007, Avril Allen, the lawyer representing the plaintiffs, asserted that:  
Ontario has the most draconian prohibitions and penalties … in all other 
provinces, doctors can elect to opt out of medicare.  Our goal is to have 
the prohibitions invalidated.  [Then] companies could start offering private 
health insurance, doctors could go out and start billing patients directly, 
and it could be the beginning of a private healthcare system. 203 
 
McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario is the most significant legal implication of the 
Chaoulli decision.  John Carplay explains that although the justices in Chaoulli were 
divided 3-3 on the issue of whether a ban on private insurance was a violation of s. 7 of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, all seven justices: 
Recognized that the de facto government monopoly over health care 
causes Canadians to suffer – both physically and psychologically – while 
waiting for medical treatment … [and]  [a]ll agreed that a law forbidding 
people to spend their own money on private health insurance also imposes 
a risk of death, and a risk of irreparable harm to one’s health.204 
 
Further, in Chaoulli, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin famously stated that 
“access to a waiting list is not access to health care.”205  In McCreith and Holmes v. 
Ontario, both plaintiffs similarly had access to a waiting list but not healthcare.206  As a 
result, Chaoulli set the stage for this case, which in turn has the potential to expand 
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across Canada the precedent that Chaoulli set in Quebec.  According to Patrick J. 
Monahan, generalizability to other provinces is a fundamental issue of the case.207  Dr. 
Jacques Chaoulli concurs, describing McCreith and Holmes as a crucial case that has a 
high probability of success.208 
McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario has the potential to be the beginning of the end 
for a single-provider public healthcare system.  However, it is too early to tell whether 
the case will even make it to the Supreme Court, let alone dismantle universal healthcare 
as we know it.209 Chris Donovan of York University notes that even if it reaches the 
Supreme Court, the justices will have to answer the many questions that have lingered in 
the post-Chaoulli era (i.e. What is a reasonable wait time? What does the term “medically 
necessary” mean, and how broadly or narrowly should it be interpreted?).  According to 
Donovan, the courts may provide answers to these questions in a way that does not 
necessarily sound the death knell for the single-provider healthcare system. 210   
Further, there is no guarantee that McCreith and Holmes would be decided in the 
same way Chaoulli was.  Since Chaoulli, the composition of the Supreme Court has 
changed dramatically.  Sack GoldBlatt and Mitchell LLP note that only seven Supreme 
Court Justices participated in the Chaoulli case, because it was heard and decided after 
the departure of Justices Arbour and Iacobucci and before the appointments of Justices 
Abella and Charon. As a result, McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario could be decided 
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differently in front of a full court.211   
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
When the Supreme Court decided that prohibitions against private health 
insurance violated Section 1 of the Quebec Charter on June 9, 2005, the decision only 
had legal implications in the province of Quebec.  However, the precedent that was set in 
Chaoulli v. Quebec gave rise to a number of piggyback cases that challenge the 
effectiveness of Canada’s public healthcare system.  Flora v. Ontario, Murray v. Alberta, 
and McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario are three examples of piggyback cases that 
highlight the vulnerability of Canada’s universal healthcare system.  
Of the three cases discussed in this chapter, Flora v. Ontario is the one that has 
been decided and the only one that did not attempt to spread the Chaoulli precedent 
across Canada.  As Graeme G. Mitchell points out, Flora v. Ontario actually sought to 
use Chaoulli to provide better public funding and more timely care to Canadians.  Unlike 
the other two copycat cases, Flora did not attempt to strike down provincial legislation 
that prohibits the sale of private health insurance, illustrating that not all post-Chaoulli 
jurisprudence is aimed at the development of private healthcare alternatives.212   
However, similar to Chaoulli, both Murray v. Alberta and McCreith and Holmes 
v. Ontario aimed at the elimination of government monopolies on essential healthcare 
services.  The Canadian Constitution Foundation (CCF) publicly supports both cases and 
their objectives—which are to reduce harm caused to Canadians by an inefficient and 
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unaccountable health care monopoly.  In May 2007, the CCF told the National Post that 
if either Murray v. Alberta or McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario is successful, politicians 
will have to accept that they can no longer prevent private health care choices, thus 
effectively shortening waiting times and improving care.213   
Their argument that the success of the Murray and/or McCreith and Holmes cases 
will improve wait times in Canada by opening the door to private medicare is highly 
contested.  In Chaoulli, Justices Binnie and LeBel (Fish JJ. concurring) stated that 
creating a two-tier system (which is the ultimate goal of the CCF and Chaoulli) might not 
reduce wait times as it would deprive the public system of vital resources214 because 
doctors would have to divert energy and commitment from the public system to the more 
lucrative private option.215 They used the Australian experience as an example, stating 
that delays in the Australian public system are largely the result of surgeons’ reluctance 
to work in public hospitals.216 
The Kirby Report (2002) went so far as to say that allowing a private parallel 
system might actually make public waiting lines longer.217  Jeremiah Hurley et al. explain 
that Canada has already experienced this in private ophthalmologic sectors in Manitoba 
and Alberta.  In those provinces, wait lists in the public system were significantly longer 
for doctors who provided services through both the public system and private clinics than 
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they were for doctors who provided services only through the public system.218   
 These three conflicting claims of the CCF, dissenting justices in Chaoulli, and the 
Kirby Report indicate the high level of uncertainty that surrounds the potential impact of 
two-tier medicare on wait times. However, the controversy that surrounds the 
public/private debate will not prevent a two-tier system from being adopted in Canada if 
either Murray v. Alberta or McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario are successful.  As Yuh 
Sung Soh points out:  
If either of the two current cases [are] successful, one can expect the 
floodgates to open to innumerable future actions. While provincial 
governments may respond to a single case by granting the particular 
benefit sought, they cannot do so if there are countless other claimants 
waiting in the wings. The only practical solution would be to allow 
everyone access to private health care insurance and to institute a two-tier 
system.219 
 
Thus, considering the impending implications of Chaoulli copycat cases, the 
consequences of the Chaoulli decision are possibly quite significant and severe.  As 
Gregory P. Marchildon stated in 2005, “the [Chaoulli] decision d[id] not strike down any 
single-payer medicare system in any province, including Quebec, [however,] it is 
certainly capable of becoming the Magna Carta for two-tier (or even multi-tier) medicare 
through judicial interpretation and extension.”220   
While Canada’s universal healthcare system remains intact for the time being, 
Chaoulli “copycat cases” have the potential to provide an impetus for change.  It can not 
be contested that the Supreme Court’s decision in Chaoulli created a legal environment 
where proponents of private medicare can and will continue to use the courts in an 
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attempt to achieve their goal of a two-tier healthcare system.  However, it is too early to 
tell whether the cases discussed in this chapter will lead to the end of Canada’s universal 
healthcare system, as it remains uncertain whether they will make it to the Supreme 
Court, yet alone be successful.  Nevertheless, one must be leery of the future, because the 
Chaoulli decision is a strong precedent that has launched a movement against the status 
quo. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHAOULLI 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Prior to Chaoulli, the Supreme Court avoided direct intervention in health care-
policy making, showing a strong preference to leave decisions concerning health care up 
to elected officials and the democratic process.221  However, this posture significantly 
changed with the release of Chaoulli on June 9, 2005.  In the 4:3 decision, the Supreme 
Court struck down Quebec laws that prohibited private health insurance on the basis that 
they violated Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.  The decision altered the 
role of the courts with regards to public policy. Janet Minor, Counsel for Ontario’s 
Attorney General in Chaoulli, believes that the decision illustrates the fact that the 
Supreme Court is not afraid to take on “hot-button social issues.”222 Colleen M. Flood 
agrees, and suggests that as a result, the courts will be fundamental in establishing the 
role that private health insurance will play in the post-Chaoulli era.223  
The prospect of this level of “judicial activism” that, arguably, was unheard of 
prior to Chaoulli, implies that constitutional supremacy could become a major pillar of 
the Canadian political order in the foreseeable future.  While the United States has a long-
standing legacy of active judicial review, Canada has historically exercised “British 
style” restrained judicial review.  In fact, judicial review and supremacy are not words 
that were typically used to describe Canada’s judiciary before Chaoulli.  However, this 
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changed dramatically following the release of the controversial decision in June 2005. In 
response to Chaoulli, Patrick Monahan said that the majority “show[ed] a new level of 
judicial activism,” McGill political scientist Christopher Manfredi said that the decision 
was, “one of the most stunning examples of judicial hubris”224 he had ever read, and Roy 
Romanow said that, “the Court move[d] from deciding questions of constitutional law to 
matters of major public policy.”225 
The Supreme Court’s judicial activism in Chaoulli has been referred to as the 
“Americanization” of the Supreme Court. Although the “Americanization” of the 
Supreme Court is not an implication of Chaoulli but rather the effect of years of North 
American integration and an individual and group rights movement that resulted in the 
implementation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the “Americanization” of the 
courts, nevertheless provided a political climate where the Chaoulli decision was 
possible.  The activism of Canada’s high court in Chaoulli, which resulted from 
Canadians’ increasing desire to assert the full extent of their rights on a wide array of 
matters, not only resulted in the policy and legal implications discussed in Chapters three 
and four, but constitutional implications as well.  
Most discussions about the impact of Chaoulli focus solely on the policy and 
legal consequences of the case.  Attention must be devoted to the constitutional 
implications of Chaoulli because it brings into question the limits of rights of citizens and 
the responsibilities of governments not only in the health field, but also in other policy 
fields. This chapter will examine the constitutional implications of Chaoulli, namely the 
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elevation of healthcare to a Charter right and the Supreme Court’s expansion of Section 7 
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  It also examines how the implementation of the 
Charter established a political context for the Chaoulli case to emerge, and for the nature 
of the judicial decision rendered in the case.  
 
 
5.2 Chaoulli and the Elevation Health Care to a Charter Right 
 
Roy Romanow, former Saskatchewan Premier and head of the 2002 Royal 
Commission into the Future of Health Care, describes the key legal effect of Chaoulli as 
being the expansion of judicial jurisdiction into social policy-making.226  As it evolved 
beyond its more traditional role as arbiter of constitutional and legal issues, University of 
Alberta Political Scientist Jay Makarenko suggests that the Supreme Court also elevated 
healthcare to a Charter right.  Though Justice Deschamps explicitly said that the Charter 
does not indicate that there is a “freestanding constitutional right to healthcare,”227  
Makarenko believes that healthcare was, at least symbolically, raised to a Charter right 
because the majority asserted that there is a right to timely access to health care under 
section 7 of the Charter.228  The findings of the Kirby Report (2002) are consistent with 
Makarenko’s argument.  In Volume Six, the Kirby Report states that: 
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Although the Charter makes no explicit references to health care … 
section 7 has significant implications in the health care question. That is, 
while health care itself may not be a right, individuals do have the right 
not to be prevented by government from seeking timely health care 
elsewhere in Canada, if the service cannot be provided in a timely manner 
within the publicly funded system.229 
 
Even though the Chaoulli decision was based on the Quebec Charter of Rights 
and not the Canadian Charter (there was a 3-3 tie over the issue), Romanow explains that 
the precedent that there is a right to timely access applies to the Canadian Charter as 
well, through “clear implication.”230  Janice Tibetts agrees, and told CanWest News that 
the Chaoulli decision did, in fact, raise health care to a Charter right, effectively 
eliminating politicians’ ability to dictate health policy.231  Similarly, Norman Anderson, 
the lawyer representing William Murray in Murray v. Alberta, told Lexpert Magazine that 
the evidence in Chaoulli indicates that “access to care” is a constitutional right under the 
Charter.232 
Policy experts and legal scholars argue that the elevated status of healthcare in 
Chaoulli created a new paradigm for the delivery of healthcare, which includes the right 
to “timely care.”  Patrick Monahan told the Globe and Mail that governments in the post-
Chaoulli era need to keep the right to timely care “front and centre” as they make 
healthcare reforms, or else they will be forced to do so by the courts.233  Former Deputy 
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Attorney General of Ontario, Mark Freidman, added that another expected effect of the 
elevation of healthcare to a Charter right will be a considerable rise in petitions involving 
patients who want quick access to health care.  Like many, Freidman and Monahan 
contend that the courts are going to play a significant role in resolving one of the most 
extensive and emotionally charged debates in Canadian history.234 
As protectors of Charter rights, the courts now have a new and important role that 
they did not have before the Chaoulli decision.  The courts are now responsible, at least 
in part, for determining the meaning of “timely access,” establishing standards for the 
delivery of care, and reviewing the public healthcare system to see if it meets those 
standards on a case-by-case basis.235  If the Supreme Court feels ill suited for this role or 
that it is inappropriate for the court to establish such definitive standards regarding what 
is “timely access”, it could defer the responsibility to elected officials as it has in the past 
with reference cases (i.e. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217).236  
However, even if the Supreme Court decides to defer the definitive responsibilities to 
elected officials, the court would still be responsible for establishing guidelines that 
bureaucrats would have to follow when crafting the standards, as well as enforcing and 
interpreting the standards in any future legal disputes. 237 
Justices Binnie, LeBel and Fish were well aware of the emergence of this new 
role if the plaintiffs won.  As a result, they were very critical of the majority, asserting 
that establishing such guidelines should remain the sole responsibility of the legislatures 
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and the democratic process because it is a difficult thing to do in a court of law.238  They 
indicated that the majority did not and could never properly determine what comprises 
“reasonable health services” or “timely care,”  as they are too circumstantial.239 In 
Paragraph 163 Binnie and LeBel asked: 
What are constitutionally required “reasonable health services”?  What is 
treatment “within a reasonable time”?  What are the benchmarks?  How 
short a waiting list is short enough?  How many MRIs does the 
Constitution require?  The majority does not tell us.  The majority lays 
down no manageable constitutional standard.  The public cannot know, 
nor can judges or governments know, how much healthcare is 
“reasonable” enough to satisfy section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (“Canadian Charter”) and section 1 of the Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12 (“Quebec Charter”).  It is to 
be hoped that we will know it when we see it.240 
 
Dr. Francois Beland, of McGill University agrees with the dissenting justices and said 
that the Supreme Court’s inability to discuss essential points of a debate on a public 
policy is evidence that the judiciary has no place in that debate, and proves that the courts 
are not well equipped to handle complex policy issues.241  
Similarly, Antonia Maioni and Christopher Manfredi contend that there are 
several problems with the courts’ new role. They argue that legislators do a better job of 
dealing with various aspects of complex policy issues such as healthcare, for three main 
reasons:   
1) The articulation of policy demands in the form of constitutional rights can exclude 
alternative policy choices from consideration.   
 
2) The adversarial nature of litigation is best suited for resolving concrete disputes 
between two parties by imposing retrospective remedies.  Complex policy issues 
– like health care – involve multiple stakeholders, constantly changing facts and 
evidence, and predicative assessments of the future impact of decisions.  
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3) Rights-based litigation, particularly at the Supreme Court level, by definition 
imposes national solutions on inherently local problems.  These solutions can 
ignore differences among provinces and suppress the provincial experimentation 
necessary to find innovative approaches to policy problems. In this particular 
instance, it further exacerbates growing tensions between Quebec and Ottawa 
over who is responsible for health care and who decides what the future of the 
system will look like.242  
 
Like many, Antonia Maioni and Christopher Manfredi condemn the court for its 
American-style activism that elevated the constitutional status of healthcare. They 
maintain that the Supreme Court’s decision put two cherished icons of Canadian public 
policy, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the public healthcare system, on a 
collision course.243 They believe that, rather than making sweeping judgments about 
complex social policy, the court should stick to deciding individual constitutional 
issues.244  
However, on the other side of the debate is the view expressed by Justice 
Deschamps, who stated that: 
Governments have promised on numerous occasions to find a solution to 
the problem of waiting lists.  Given the tendency to focus the debate on a 
sociopolitical philosophy, it seems that governments have lost sight of the 
urgency of taking concrete action.  The courts are therefore the last line of 
defence for citizens.245 
 
Stanley Hartt supports this view and contends that the Chaoulli decision was justified 
because governments have failed to resolve problems that have ailed the healthcare 
system for years.  He argues that Chaoulli is a wonderful wakeup call for our society 
because the Canadian government now has to invest in, or lose the public health system, 
thus, forcing the government to “put its money where its mouth is.”  Hartt acknowledged 
                                                
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Amy Smeltzer, “Chaoulli revives public health care debate,” Ultra vires (18 October 2005), 6, accessed 
online at http://www.ultravires.ca/pdf/UVOct05.pdf (Retrieved 22 January 2008). 
245 Chaoulli v. Quebec., Para. 96. 
 66 
that allowing private Medicare would primarily benefit the wealthy.  However, he 
suggests that it is not the role of the courts, but rather the role of government, to ensure 
that access to health care is relatively equal.  Hartt believes that the court’s only job is to 
make sure rights are not being violated, and that since the courts did their job, the 
government should be embarrassed.246  
Despite much criticism and some praise for the decision, the precedent set in 
Chaoulli stands and the constitutional status of healthcare has been raised.  As a result, 
future cases such as Murray v. Alberta and McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario will have to 
deal with many questions that were left unanswered in Chaoulli, such as: What are 
reasonable health services?  What constitutes medically necessary services?  And what is 
treatment within a reasonable time?  Sujit Choudhry points out that until these questions 
are decided, Chaoulli has designated the courts as the arbitrators of “reasonable wait 
times” for “medically necessary services” on a case-by-case basis.  Choudhry concludes 
that Chaoulli has created an “institutional quagmire, a constitutional quicksand that will 
severely test the lower courts.”247 
 
5.3 Chaoulli and the Expansion of Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
 
 When the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was accepted by the Federal and 
Provincial governments (except Quebec) in 1982, it was understood that it would be a 
“constitutional vehicle” that would protect vulnerable Canadians from harm, just as 
Canada’s universal public healthcare system protects those who are unable to afford 
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necessary medical treatment.248  However, it was also understood that rights under the 
Charter were limited.  As Roy Romanow explains, the Charter was not intended to 
protect against “economic deprivations or guarantee benefits” that may enhance an 
individual’s section 7 rights to life, liberty, or security of person (i.e. cosmetic or non-
medically necessary surgery).  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chaoulli 
did just that, expanding section 7 of the Charter. 249    
Despite the fact that Justice Deslisle J.A, of the Quebec Court of Appeal 
distinguished economic claims like the right to purchase private health insurance from 
fundamental section 7 rights, the Supreme Court interpreted section 7 in a way that 
extended it to include a right to purchase private insurance. 250  William P. Georgas and 
Lynne Golding indicate that all seven justices that sat on Chaoulli, not just the slim 
majority, acknowledged that a lack of timely access to healthcare may infringe a patient’s 
section 7 rights to “life” and “security of person” in at least some instances.251  Thus, the 
entire Supreme Court bench determined that a denial of health services for medically 
necessary procedures, within a “reasonable time,” could violate an individual’s section 7 
rights.252  
Nola Ries, a research associate at the University of Alberta Health Law Institute, 
does not find the expansion of section 7 into health matters overly surprising.  Ries 
indicates that the courts have been dealing with health issues since 1988 with R. vs. 
Morgentaler, and have continued to do so up to the Chaoulli decision in 2005 (i.e. 
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (1993), Hitzig et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen (2003), and 
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Auton v. Attorney General of British Columbia (2004)).253 Given previous section 7 
claims, she believed that Chaoulli was inevitable.  Similarly, volume six of the Kirby 
Report notes that a number of legal experts recognized that section 7 has application to 
healthcare, and that it was merely a matter of time before its parameters would be 
explored more thoroughly in the courts.  Patrick Monahan and Stanley Hartt, authors of 
The Charter and Health Care: Guaranteeing Timely Access to Health Care for 
Canadian, similarly predicted the expansion of section 7. They maintained that:  
An individual’s decisions with respect to his or her medical care are 
fundamental personal decisions affecting health, life and death and are 
therefore protected under the section 7 liberty guarantee.  Consequently, 
when governments effectively prevent individuals from obtaining health 
care outside the publicly funded system, they have a concomitant 
obligation to ensure that timely care is provided within that system.254 
 
However, one’s level of surprise or foresight does not change the fact that the 
expansion of section 7 in Chaoulli opened up the possibility of a further broadening of 
the Charter into social and economic rights.  For example, there are presently no 
“constitutionalized social rights” other than healthcare (“access to timely care”), which 
may change in the post-Chaoulli era.  In Romanow’s response to Chaoulli, in the article 
titled In Search of a Mandate?, he says that the Supreme Court’s decision to expand 
section 7 may be an indication that the Court wants to put its touch on other public 
programs and policies as well, and not necessarily in a way that is consistent with 
fundamental Canadian values.255  
Jay Makarenko illustrates the expansive and destructive potential of Section 7 in 
the following example: 
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Take a situation in which a person is unable to access medical treatment 
because they cannot pay for it.  Timely access to health care is definitely 
limited in this case - in fact, the person cannot receive medical treatment at 
all.  Further, this would seem to trigger the Section 7 interests of life and 
security of the person (as the majority has defined them in the Chaoulli).  
If one cannot access health care at all, then there is a great risk of suffering 
and death.  The courts could then, and with little further justification, 
extend the right to include situations in which other barriers (besides the 
absence of opportunity) limit persons’ access to timely medical treatment. 
This would definitely make the Section 7 right to timely access a full-
fledged social right.256   
 
 He suggests that if section 7 were expanded in such a manner, the argument could 
be made that private medicare could exist, as long as the public healthcare system took 
care of those who are unable to afford private insurance.  However, the government 
would be obligated to provide care that was consistent with the right to equality under 
Section 15 of the Charter.  Therefore, if a parallel system came into existence, the quality 
of service would have to be comparable or else people could assert that they were being 
discriminated against on the grounds of income or wealth.  Makarenko adds that it is 
questionable whether it is even possible to provide “healthcare equality” in a country as 
regionally diverse as Canada, and that efforts to provide such equality would entail be 
astronomical economic and social costs.257   
Finally, Makarenko contends that prior to Chaoulli, such an extension of the 
Charter was not possible because one could not make arguments about extending section 
7, let alone section 15.  As Romanow explains, past section 7 cases have been treated 
with caution and sensitivity, in recognition of its “potentially expansive content.”258 
However, this sensitivity was abandoned in Chaoulli, setting a precedent under which the 
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Charter could be further expanded in the future.259  Byron Williams, Director of the 
Public Interest Law Centre, concludes that:  
Regardless of one’s views on the public health care system in Canada and 
whether the Supreme Court was right or wrong in its deliberations, 
Chaoulli is extremely important … [because it] broadened the scope of s. 
7 considerably by entering into the health care realm, a matter not, some 
would argue, typically considered to fall within “the administration of 
justice.”  The door may have been opened sufficiently wide enough for 
future cases that challenge any legislative scheme that infringes upon 
one’s rights to life, liberty and/or security or the person in an arbitrary 
manner.260 
 
 
 
5.4 The implementation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Setting the stage for 
the “Americanization” of the courts, Chaoulli, and future activism 
 
The implementation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 forever 
altered the functioning and operations of the Supreme Court of Canada and helped set the 
stage for the Chaoulli decision. Former Chief Justice Antonia Lamer refers to the 
introduction of the Charter as being “nothing less than a revolution on the scale of the 
introduction of the metric system, the great medical discoveries of Louis Pasteur, and the 
invention of penicillin and the laser.”261  
With the implementation of the Charter, the Supreme Court was given the 
institutional framework required to become an effective protector of basic rights of 
disadvantaged groups and individuals.  Through this new power, the court’s traditional 
function of adjudicating disputes involving federalism and the separation of powers 
changed to making decisions regarding fundamental rights and liberties, such as 
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expression, religion, and due process.262 Peter Russell illustrates this change by indicating 
that constitutional law has become the most significant “legal category” on the Supreme 
Court’s docket in the Charter era.263  
Constitutional experts Ran Hirschl and Christopher L. Eisgruber indicate that as a 
result of the shift, the Supreme Court has become one of Canada’s most important policy-
making bodies, much like it is in the United States.  Further, they point out that, since 
1982, the role of Canadian courts has evolved from merely mediating disputes between 
governments to making decisions that have serious implications for the policy-making 
powers of the legislature and executive.  Hirschl and Eisgruber suggest that the Supreme 
Court’s willingness to settle controversial political questions (not legal questions) is 
evidence of this claim.  Some contentious political questions the Supreme Court of 
Canada has made judgment on in recent years include: the rights of indigenous peoples, 
same-sex marriage, language rights, the political and cultural distinctness of Quebec, and 
the topic of discussion in this thesis, the right to private healthcare.264   
The newfound willingness of the Supreme Court of Canada to deal with these 
complex political and social issues is more characteristic of an American-style of 
adjudication than a traditional Canadian one, a fundamental symptom of the 
“Americanization” of the Canadian judicial system.  Stephen Brooks describes   
“Americanization” as a process in which the promotion of individual rights trumps 
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deference to political authority.265 Brooks suggests that since the implementation of the 
Charter, Canadians consider themselves to be more “rights bearing” and increasingly 
“differential” towards politicians.  Consequently, they become more reliant on the courts 
than parliament for important political decisions (i.e. the right to private health 
insurance).  According to Brooks, this behavioral shift has altered the role of Canada’s 
political institutions, specifically the judiciary, to become more American-like.  
Christopher P. Manfredi agrees, and contends that the so-called 
“Americanization” of the judicial system is the direct and progressive result of the 
Charter.  Manfredi suggests that without the Charter, the Supreme Court would have 
never been able to deal with complex policy issues like it did in Chaoulli.  He explains 
that the Charter has increased the judicial policymaking power of the courts by 
expanding the range of social and political issues that are subject to the court’s 
jurisdiction.  He argues, therefore, that an outcome like Chaoulli should be expected, as it 
is a commensurate expansion of the Court’s decision making capacity.266  Andrew Petter, 
Dean of Law at the University of Victoria, concurs, and suggests that the political 
decision-making of the Supreme Court in Chaoulli should come as no surprise.  After all, 
politicians and scholars have nurtured the Court’s power since the inception of the 
Charter in 1982, and as such have empowered the court to make judgments on political 
issues.267 
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Petter believes that this type of American style judicial activism will persist in the 
future, as politicians increasingly look to the courts to solve problems they cannot win in 
the political arena.268  Charles Wright agrees, and indicates that the reason the 
government failed to resolve waiting list problems prior to Chaoulli was because of the 
political cost involved.  Wright asks: “How do you get governments and politicians to 
face tough decisions that may lose them next election?”269  Judicial activists argue that 
the only way to do this is through the courts.  As the Harvard Law Review suggests, even 
if the judiciary did not advocate an adequate solution (private insurance) to the ailments 
of the public healthcare system, Chaoulli nevertheless forced governments to respond to 
the situation.  The Harvard Law Review argues that if the issue was simply deferred to 
the legislature rather than the courts, little would have been done to improve wait lists 
and the unacceptable status quo would have been legitimized.270 
Regardless of whether one prefers the American-style of judicial activism used by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Chaoulli, the fact remains that Chaoulli heightened the 
policy-making powers of the courts within the Canadian polity.  As Hirschl and Eisgruber 
suggest, Chaoulli v. Quebec brings Canada closer to judicial convergence with the United 
States with respect to judicial activism, the judicialization of politics, and the scope of its 
constitutional rights jurisprudence.271 This convergence is commonly referred to as the 
“Americanization” of the judicial system and has fundamentally altered the role and 
behavior of the courts.   
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Many hope that the Supreme Court will recalibrate its approach in future cases 
and steer clear of public policy issues and political decision-making.  However, the battle 
looks tough for these hopefuls, as the courts have set in motion a chain of events that will 
be hard to undo.  As Allen C. Hutchinson points out, the judiciary has been responsible 
for dealing with an increasing number of political controversies that used to be resolved 
in the House of Commons.272  Consequently, Patrick Monahan’s suggestion that the 
precedent of Chaoulli means that healthcare reform might be achieved through the courts 
instead of legislators is entirely possible. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Before Chaoulli, virtually all decisions regarding how and when patients could 
access medical services were considered to be beyond the purview of the Charter and the 
courts, and solely the responsibility of the democratic legislatures.273  However, this all 
changed with the Chaoulli decision, when four Supreme Court Justices ruled that 
prohibitions against private health insurance violated section 1 of the Quebec Charter, 
three of whom also ruled that the prohibitions violated section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter.274  The Supreme Court’s decision to directly intervene in healthcare 
policymaking showed an unprecedented level of judicial activism, which resulted in a 
number of constitutional implications.  
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The most visible of these implications is the elevation of healthcare to a “Charter 
right.”  While the elevated status of healthcare is merely symbolic, the effects of its 
elevation are very real and have the potential to completely transform the Canadian 
healthcare system.  Healthcare’s constitutional promotion now forces governments to 
deliver “timely care” to patients.  Failing that, they risk further court challenges and the 
possibility of being forced into adopting a two-tier healthcare system, since the justices 
determined that individuals have a constitutional right to timely healthcare under Section 
7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
The elevation of healthcare also had an effect on the operation of the courts, as 
they now have a new role to play in the field of health policy.  The courts now have the 
responsibility to determine what timely access means and to review the health system to 
see if it meets those standards.  In effect, the courts will act as arbitrators of “reasonable 
wait times” on a case-to-case basis.  Although it is argued that this is not the proper role 
of the courts, the precedent set in Chaoulli bestows the courts with a constitutional 
responsibility to deal with future healthcare issues. 
A separate but related constitutional implication regards the Supreme Court’s 
expansion of Section 7 of the Charter.  While the constitutional and political negotiators 
involved in the creation of the Charter never intended section 7 to protect the “economic 
rights” of citizens, the justices in Chaoulli ignored section 7’s original intent and 
extended it to include such rights.  Consequently, it can be argued that justice in Chaoulli 
was calculated by personal preference rather that broader social need, using section 7 to 
protect the right of one and jeopardizing the rights of many.   The potential for further 
expansion of the Charter exists, however, it is uncertain whether or not this decision will 
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be a major turning point in how the court deals with future cases regarding medicare and 
other public policies.275   However, Romanow is especially convinced that the Supreme 
Court’s decision to expand section 7 in Chaoulli set in motion a chain of events that will 
ultimately lead to a litigious attack on the fundamental values of Canadians, 
redistributing social justice and adversely affecting other public policies and programs.276  
It is important to note that the Chaoulli case would never have been decided the 
way that it was if the Charter of Rights and Freedoms had not been in place.  The 
implementation of the Charter in 1982 fundamentally altered the behavior of the 
judiciary, giving the courts the power it needed to make decisions such as Chaoulli.  
Although the decision to deal with health policy in Chaoulli is surrounded by 
controversy, academics and policy experts agree that the decision was the predictable 
consequence of progressive judicial liberation.  Constitutional experts accordingly 
contend that Chaoulli v. Quebec is just one step further towards judicial convergence 
with the United States.  Further, they believe that the decision drastically changed how 
the court will look at social policy and Charter rights in the future. In this respect, it is 
possible that Chaoulli could have implications well beyond the health sector.  However, 
this is also open to debate.  Given the fact that Chaoulli was decided 4-3 and there was a 
shortened bench (7 justices rather than 9), it is entirely possible that the next time a 
charter issue is raised regarding the “deprivation of social and economic rights” a slightly 
different set of justices may decide that the courts should not be involved in such issues.  
Therefore, Chaoulli v. Quebec may not be the key singular case that determines the role 
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of the courts with regard to social and economic policy.  But, if it turns out to be that 
case, Chaoulli could have implications well beyond the health sector. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The central objective of this thesis has been to examine the policy, legal, and 
constitutional implications of Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) with a view to 
determining the effects that the Supreme Court’s decision has had both on the rights of 
Canadians within the scope of the publicly funded healthcare system and on the structure 
of that system.  In the preceding chapters, the policy, legal, and constitutional effects of 
Chaoulli have been discussed separately. The primary objective of this concluding 
chapter is to summarize and analyze the findings and to provide some suggestions for 
further research.  
 
6.2 Summary of Major Findings 
 
The Chaoulli decision has done more than just instigate public debate surrounding 
the future of the Canadian healthcare system.  It has resulted in adjustments to federal and 
provincial healthcare policies, additional court cases on the rights of individuals to health 
care, and the expansion of the importance of the Canadian and Quebec Charters of rights 
and freedoms for the operation of Medicare in Canada.  However, despite these 
implications it is still too early to tell whether the Chaoulli decision was the start of a 
revolution towards privatization of health and hospital care that will result either in a two-
tier system or the complete demise of the public healthcare system.   
The enactment of Bill 33 in Quebec, which permitted the establishment of private 
hospitals and associated medical clinics, is evidence that the door to private health 
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insurance and a two-tier system has been opened.  Marie-Claude Premont notes that, 
prior to Bill 33, Quebec’s provincial government assured its constituents that maximum 
financial and human resources would be channeled towards a healthcare system that was 
devoted to the “whole of the population,” not a private system that caters to only a small 
portion of the population. Like many, she believes that the structure set in place by Bill 
33 established a foundation on which a two-tier system can and will develop.277  
However, whether Bill 33 is merely a limited solution to address wait times and 
nothing more than Quebec’s required response to Chaoulli, or whether it is a key measure 
in moving toward the development of a two-tier system, is open to debate.  The extension 
of Bill 33 in Quebec to other health services and the development of a two-tier system in 
Canada is highly dependent on the future responses of the provincial and federal 
governments in meeting the health care needs of citizens.   Thus, it remains unclear 
whether Chaoulli triggered political responses that will fundamentally alter the face of 
medicare or whether it is merely a court decision in which the legal and constitutional 
implications are still unclear.  
The only other official policy response to Chaoulli besides Bill 33 was the 
promise by the provinces and territories to establish “Patient Wait Guarantees” by 2010.  
The establishment of these “legally enforceable guarantees of timely access to medical 
care” is absolutely essential in protecting legislative prohibitions on accessing private 
healthcare and preventing the development of a two-tier system.278  If these guarantees 
are either not established or are considered to be inadequate by the judiciary, it is likely 
that constitutional challenges in other provinces such as Murray v. Alberta and McCreith 
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and Holmes v. Ontario will be successful because the Chaoulli decision affirmed that 
Canadians cannot be denied access to timely care.  
The Supreme Court’s affirmation of this right in Chaoulli has many implications. 
The primary effect of Chaoulli is that the right to timely care cannot be confined to the 
province of Quebec. As Patrick J. Monahan states: 
Post-Chaoulli, it is simply not sustainable politically for political leaders 
outside of Quebec to suggest that their citizens lack basic rights to timely 
care that are available only in Quebec … political discussions that have 
occurred over the past year have implicitly accepted that the result of 
Chaoulli applies across the country, rather than in a single province.279 
 
The emergence of Flora v. Ontario, Murray v. Alberta, and McCreith and Holmes 
v. Ontario validate Monahan’s argument that the implications of Chaoulli are widespread 
and appear to be growing with time.  These copycat cases further indicate that if 
governments do not establish legally enforceable limits on waiting times for medically 
necessary services, the courts will require them to provide individuals with the 
opportunity to purchase private insurance for required services.  In the words of 
Monahan, Chaoulli created a “new paradigm for the delivery of healthcare that includes 
the right of patients to timely care.” Like many other observers, he believes that if they 
fail to keep such rights “front and centre” in health care planning, governments will be 
forced to do so by the courts through jurisprudence in other provinces (i.e. Murray v. 
Alberta and McCreith and Holmes v. Ontario).280 
 Another effect of affirming that Canadians have a constitutional right to “timely 
care” has to do with the role of Canada’s judiciary.  As a result of the Chaoulli ruling, the 
courts are now partially responsible for determining what “timely access” means and for 
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reviewing the healthcare system to see if it meets those standards.  Prior to Chaoulli, the 
Supreme Court judges were very careful to focus on constitutional and legal principles 
and to avoid dealing with social policies.  However, the intervention of the courts into the 
realm of health policy in Chaoulli altered the historical role of the courts because, 
according to Romanow, “the court ventured beyond constitutional and legal principles 
and into complex social policy.”281   
In doing so, the justices in Chaoulli expanded Section 7 of the Canadian Charter 
so that it now, at least symbolically, applies to healthcare.  Even though the Chaoulli 
decision was decided based on Section 1 of the potentially broader Quebec Charter (4-3), 
rather than Section 7 of the Canadian Charter (3-3) policy and legal experts agree that 
the Canadian Charter applies to healthcare through “clear implication” because of the 
similarities between Section 1 of the Quebec Charter and Section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter (See Appendix B).  As a result, the courts must now deal with this “new right” 
(the right to ‘timely care’) by acting as arbitrators, determining whether wait times are 
“reasonable” on a case-to-case basis.  Not only does this transfer authority from elected 
officials to appointed judges, but it also threatens the very existence of Canada’s 
universal healthcare and other social programs.  Simply put, the precedent set in Chaoulli 
indicates that the application of Section 7 could be applied to other social policies, none 
of which are now “off limits” to the courts.  
Taking the expansive potential of Section 7 into consideration, the implications of 
Chaoulli seem limitless.  However, just three years after the Supreme Court decision was 
handed down, the full implications of the case are still unclear.  One can only speculate as 
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to whether the Chaoulli decision will inevitably lead to the development of a two tier 
healthcare system or merely to substantive reform to the single payer system.   
In the post-Chaoulli era, the future of the Canadian healthcare system lies in the 
hands of elected and appointed officials, including judges.  It is up to these officials to 
either improve the universal single-payer system by providing timely access to care and 
establishing performance benchmarks, or to allow the introduction of private alternatives. 
The progress and pace of healthcare reform will determine which option will prevail.  
It remains to be see whether Canadians will “stand up for Medicare”282  While 
there is still time to do so, if swift action is not taken by governments the implementation 
of a two-tier healthcare system in Canada is only a matter of time.  Odette Madore states 
that:  
The Chaoulli decision has [legally] opened the door to the development of 
a two-tier system … it is no longer possible to simply debate whether or 
not a private market for health care insurance should exist … the question 
now is how best to make use of the duplicate private health care insurance 
market given the lessons learned from other countries’ experience.283 
 
There is no denying that the Chaoulli decision opened the door to private health 
insurance in Quebec with the implementation of Bill 33, and created the possibility for 
“copycat cases” to produce similar results in the rest of Canada.  However, it can be 
argued that Chaoulli is not the end of Medicare in Canada.  While the Supreme Court 
affirmed that adequate and timely health care is a constitutional right of all Canadians, it 
did not make a definitive ruling as to whether a parallel health care system is 
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constitutionally mandated.  Thus, it effectively returned the matter to the federal and 
provincial governments.   
As a result, the federal and provincial governments have been granted an 
opportunity to modernize Medicare by shortening wait times and providing timely access 
to Canadians.  In 2005, Steven Lewis aptly said “The choice is ours: We can be fiddlers 
or firefighters [for Medicare] as Rome [ha]s [been] set ablaze.”284  In the future, 
Canadians will have to determine whether they want to improve the public system by 
devoting more resources and/or maximizing the utility of existing resources to reduce 
wait times and improve care or have the courts rule in favor of the emergence of a two-
tier health system.285 
 
6.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
In addition to research to examine more fully the implications of Chaoulli and the 
“copy cat cases” for the various provincial and territorial health care systems in Canada 
in the near and distant future, some further research should be undertaken regarding two-
tier and multi-tier health care systems.  Previous studies conducted by the Honorable Roy 
J. Romanow (the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada) and Honorable 
Michael J.L. Kirby (The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and 
Technology) have already examined foreign health systems and the potential advantages 
and disadvantages of adopting a two-tier or multi-tier healthcare system in Canada. 
Future research should not duplicate these comprehensive studies, but rather use the 
information collected in both studies, along with supplementary research, to determine 
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what type of two-tier or multi-tier healthcare system would be preferable in the event that 
Canada has to allow private insurance due to judicial decisions.   
Future research must re-examine foreign healthcare systems to develop a two-tier 
or multi-tier model that attempts to minimize the negative effects (i.e. cream skimming, 
longer wait lists, and queue jumping) and maximize the benefits (i.e. efficiency, 
consumer choice, and responsiveness) associated with such systems.  In doing so, it is 
important to consider the effects that private medicare could have on different provinces, 
given that provinces such as Saskatchewan and New Brunswick already permit 
supplementary private insurance but do not have a market that could sustain a system of 
private health care, whereas densely populated provinces such as Alberta and Ontario 
could easily sustain a system of private health care.   
Such research is even more necessary now than it was when the reports produced 
by Kirby and Romanow were released in 2002 (pre-Chaoulli).  Given the Chaoulli 
decision and the pending decisions on Murray v. Alberta and McCreith and Holmes v. 
Ontario, it is vital that the federal and provincial governments be prepared to adopt a 
two-tier or multi-tier healthcare system in case either challenge is successful.  If 
governments are not adequately prepared, they could be forced by the courts into 
developing a two-tier or multi-tier system regardless of whether they are adequately 
prepared to do so. 
Future research also needs to be conducted on whether the adoption of a two-tier 
or multi-tier system will prevent future Charter challenges like Chaoulli v. Quebec and 
Murray v. Alberta.  Considering that section 7 was extended in Chaoulli and the demand 
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for health care is potentially limitless,286 it is possible that citizens could continue to 
make demands on the state for more extensive and substantial health care services.  It 
may be wrong to assume, as some do, that if Canada adopts a two-tier or multi-tier 
system, there will be no more Charter challenges in the realm of healthcare.  Chaoulli 
may have let the genie out of the bottle, and getting it back into the bottle may be 
impossible.  
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Appendix A: Wait Time Data (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
Median Wait from Referral by General Practitioner to Treatment in 2005, According to 
Province (Panel A) and Specialty (Panel B). 
 
 
 
From: Robert Steinbrook. “Private Health Care in Canada.” In the New England 
Journal of Medicine. Volume 354:1661-1664. April 20, 2006. Number 16. 
<http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/354/16/1661>. (Retrieved 13 December 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 87 
Appendix B: Laws Challenged in Chaoulli v. Quebec 
 
Section 11 of the Hospital Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A-28: No one shall make or renew, 
or make a payment under a contract under which  
(a) A resident is to be provided with or to be reimbursed for the cost of any hospital 
service that is one of the insured services;  
(b) Payment is conditional upon the hospitalization of a resident; or 
(c) Payment if dependent upon the length of time the resident is a patient in a facility 
maintained by an institution contemplated in section 2. 
 
Section 15 of the Health Insurance Act, Sec. R.S.Q., c. A-29: No person shall make or 
renew a contract of insurance or make a payment under a contract of insurance under 
which an insured service is furnished or under which all or part of the cost of such a 
service is paid to a resident or a deemed resident of Québec or to another person on his 
behalf. 
 
Section 1 of the Quebec Charter: Every human being has a right to life, and to personal 
security, inviolability and freedom. 
 
Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Everyone has the right to life, liberty, 
and security of the person, and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice. 
 
Section 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Every Individual is equal before 
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law 
without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national 
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
 
 
 
From: Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP. “Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) A new 
frontier for Canadian health care?” in Health Law Bulletin. June 2005.  
 
Government of Canada. “Your Guide to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Special Edition.” Ottawa, 2002. 
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Appendix C: The Five Principles of the Canada Health Act (CHA) 
 
 
 
1. Public Administration: This criterion applies to the health insurance plans of the 
provinces and territories. The health care insurance plans are to be administered 
and operated on a non-profit basis by a public authority, responsible to the 
provincial/territorial governments and subject to audits of their accounts and 
financial transactions. 
 
2. Comprehensiveness: The health insurance plans of the provinces and territories 
must insure all insured health services* (hospital, physician, surgical-dental) and, 
where permitted, services rendered by other health care practitioners. *See 
definition under Health Care Services Covered by the Act. 
 
3. Universality: One hundred percent of the insured residents of a province or 
territory must be entitled to the insured health services provided by the plans on 
uniform terms and conditions. Provinces and territories generally require that 
residents register with the plans to establish entitlement. 
 
4. Portability: Residents moving from one province or territory to another must 
continue to be covered for insured health care services by the "home" province 
during any minimum waiting period, not to exceed three months, imposed by the 
new province of residence. After the waiting period, the new province or territory 
of residence assumes health care coverage. 
 
Residents temporarily absent from their home provinces or territories, or from the 
country, must also continue to be covered for insured health care services. This 
allows individuals to travel or be absent, within prescribed limits, from their home 
provinces or territories but still retain their health insurance coverage. 
 
The portability criterion does not entitle a person to seek services in another 
province, territory or country, but is more intended to entitle one to receive 
necessary services in relation to an urgent or emergent need when absent on a 
temporary basis, such as on business or vacation. 
 
If insured persons are temporarily absent in another province or territory, insured 
services are to be paid at the host province's rate. If insured persons are 
temporarily out of the country, insured services are to be paid at the home 
province's rate. 
 
In some cases, coverage may be extended for elective (non-emergency) service in 
another province or territory, or out of the country. Prior approval by one's health 
insurance plan may also be required. 
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5. Accessibility: The health insurance plans of the provinces and territories must 
provide:  
 
• Reasonable access to insured health care services on uniform terms and 
conditions, unprecluded, unimpeded, either directly or indirectly, by 
charges (user charges or extra-billing) or other means (age, health status or 
financial circumstances); 
• Reasonable access in terms of physical availability of medically necessary 
services has been interpreted under the Canada Health Act using the 
"where and as available" rule. Thus, residents of a province or territory are 
entitled to have access to insured health care services at the setting 
"where" the services are provided and "as" the services are available in 
that setting; 
• Reasonable compensation to physicians and dentists for all the insured 
health care services they provide; and 
• Payment to hospitals to cover the cost of insured health care services. 
 
 
 
 
From: Health Canada. “Canada Health Act Overview.” 25 November 2002. <http:// 
www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/media/nr-cp/2002/2002_care-soinsbk4_e.html>. (Retrieved 2 
January 2008). 
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Appendix D: Section 28.4 of the Ontario Health Insurance Plan 
 
 
For out-of-country reimbursement for health services Section 28.4 of the Ontario Health 
Insurance Plan lays out the test that applicants must meet to receive compensation: 
 
(2) Services that are part of a treatment and that are rendered outside Canada at a hospital 
or health facility are prescribed as insured services if, 
 
(a) The treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in    
the same medical circumstances as the insured person; and 
 
(b) Either, 
(i) That kind of treatment that is not performed in Ontario by an 
identical or equivalent procedure, or 
(ii) That kind of treatment is performed in Ontario but it is necessary 
that the insured person travel out of Canada to avoid a delay that 
would result in death or medically significant irreversible tissue 
damage. 
 
 
 
 
Source: David Baker and Faisal Bhabha. “Universality and Medical Necessity: Statutory 
and Charter Remedies to Individual Claims to Ontario Health Insurance Funding.” In 
Health Law Review. Volume 13. No. 1. 2004. Pg. 28.  
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